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Asymmetry in Criminal Appeals
INTRODUCTION

The government bears most of the risk of error in a criminal
trial: factual error because of the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt1 and legal error because of the prohibition on
government appeal of acquittals.' Neither of these procedural
mechanisms has a counterpart in civil procedure.
An important consequence of the asymmetric risk of error in
criminal cases is that there are more acquittals than there would
be under symmetric risk of error, ceteris paribus. That is, assuming
all other rules of criminal procedure and evidence remain the
same, more defendants would be convicted (by guilty plea or after
trial) under the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence
than are convicted under the reasonable doubt standard. Similarly,
if appeal by the government were allowed, some acquitted defendants would suffer reversal and be convicted at a retrial.
Other commentators have analyzed the effect of the criminal
system's higher standard of proof on the risk of factual error at
trial.3 These analyses show that raising the burden of proof increases the likelihood of false negatives (acquittals of "factually
guilty" persons), and decreases the likelihood of false positives
(convictions of "factually innocent" persons). The civil preponderance of the evidence standard minimizes the risk-the expected total-of factual errors.' The criminal system's higher burden of
I The

Due Process Clause requires this burden of proof. In Re Winship, 397 US 358,

364 (1970).
1 The Constitution's prohibition on double jeopardy requires this rule. US Const,
Amend V; Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 126 (1904); and Benton v Maryland, 395
US 784, 795-97 (1969). See also United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 671 (1896) (dictum).
3 See, for example, V. C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 Vand L Rev 807, 815-16 (1961); and Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B.
Kadane, The Presentation of Bayesian StatisticalAnalyses in Legal Proceedings,32 The
Statistician 88 (1983). See generally David Kaye, The Laws of Probabilityand the Law of
the Land, 47 U Chi L Rev 34 (1979).
4 Under a preponderance standard, the plaintiff must show that his allegations are
"more likely than not" true. This standard minimizes the expected total of false negatives
and false positives. See Ball, 14 Vand L Rev at 817 (cited in note 3); and David Kaye,
Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 Yale L J 601, 603-05 (1980) (book review of Michael 0.
Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law (Free Press, 1978)). Only this standard treats the
cost of factual error against the defendant and the cost of factual error against the plaintiff
as equal (except at the point of equipoise, where the defendant prevails). See Kaye, 89 Yale
L J at 608 (cited in note 3); and Lea Brilmayer and Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative
Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U Chi L Rev 116, 151 (1978) (also reviewing Finkelstein's
Quantitative Methods in Law).
A few commentators have suggested that the burden of proof should be set so as to
equalize the probability of pro-plaintiff factual error and pro-defendant factual error. See,
for example, Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law at 59-104; and Laurence H. Tribe,
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proof on the government increases the risk of factual error, in the
pro-defendant direction. The imposition of a higher burden of
proof in criminal cases indicates, of course, that minimizing the
risk of factual error is not the only goal of the criminal process. In
the Anglo-American tradition, the social cost of factual error
against the defendant (a "false positive") is deemed greater than
the social cost of factual error against the government (a "false
negative").5
'In this article I examine some consequences of asymmetric
risk of legal error6 in criminal cases. While the burden of proof is
the major procedural mechanism for apportioning the risk of factual error, the body of rules governing appellate review is the major procedural mechanism for apportioning the risk of legal error.7
The most basic of these rules is that a defendant can appeal a conviction by alleging pro-government legal error in the trial court,

Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv L Rev 1329,
1349-50 (1971). But unless the distribution of disputes concerning the relevant issue is symmetric with respect to the legal standard, this goal implies a bias for the defendant or the
plaintiff in particular cases. See illustration in Kaye, 89 Yale L J at 604-07. See also James
Brook, Inevitable Errors:The Preponderanceof the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation,
18 Tulsa L J 79, 107-08 (1982) and note 63, below.
I See also Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L J 1299, 1302 n 9 (1977) (the reasonable doubt
formulation, which has been used for two centuries in Anglo-American law, was intended to
guard against use of an even higher standard of proof).
" There is some confusion in the literature between factual error, legal error, and "outcome" error. Some scholars refer to errors in trial outcomes-acquittals of guilty defendants
or convictions of innocent defendants-as factual errors. See, for example, sources cited in
notes 3 and 4. Occasionally, however, scholars refer to incorrect outcomes as legal errors.
See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Legal Error,Litigation,and the
Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J L Econ & Org 99-100 (1989). The use of general jury verdicts rather than special verdicts in criminal cases makes it difficult to determine whether
an error in the final outcome stems from errors in ascertaining the underlying facts or from
wrongly applying a legal standard to the underlying facts. See also note 25. Legal error in
the latter sense may or may not result in an error in trial outcome. See note 8. Moreover,
outcome errors are also related to the burden of proof, the peculiarities of jury decision
making, evidentiary rules, and other factors.
' In addition to direct appeal, state and federal collateral review is available to a defendant, for instance on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Collateral review operates
similarly to direct appeal, in effect permitting additional stages of appellate review of criminal cases. See James Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure 386-88
(Michie, 1988) (in the last quarter century, the legal system has explicitly come to accept
federal habeas corpus as a continuation of the appellate process, preceding finality rather
than operating as a truly collateral remedy); and Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador, and
Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 103-05 (West, 1976). For the present analysis, I ignore the consequences of collateral review in criminal cases, except to note here that habeas
corpus review creates further asymmetry between pro-government and pro-defendant legal
error.

1990]

Asymmetry in Criminal Appeals

5

but the government cannot appeal an acquittal by alleging pro-defendant error.
To some extent, analysis of the risk of legal error parallels that
of factual error. Legal error at trial may result in the acquittal of a
defendant who would otherwise have been convicted (a false
negative), or it may result in the conviction of a defendant who
would otherwise have been acquitted (a false positive). A simple
probability model of the risk of legal error, presented in Section I,
confirms the intuition that prohibiting one side from appealing increases the risk of legal error (the expected total of false negatives
and false positives), placing most of the risk on the side that cannot appeal." Thus, prohibiting government appeals in criminal
cases 9 places most of the risk of legal error on the government.
My ultimate concerns, however, go beyond the apportionment
of the risk of legal error. I am especially interested in two additional issues. First, might the prohibition on government appeals-which prevents appellate courts from reviewing claims of
pro-defendant trial court error-actually increase total pro-defendant error in the trial courts? Second, might the prohibifion affect
the evolution of appellate-defined legal standards? Sections II
through V of the article begin to explore how the asymmetry in
criminal appeals may distort the perceptions and incentives of
both judges and litigants and thereby bias the development and
application of standards of law.
Of course, the structure of appellate rights is but one of many
possible sources of bias in criminal litigation. The present analysis
8 In discussions of legal error, a false negative (Type I error) means that the acquittal
(the "negative") was "false" because it resulted in part from legal error. A false positive
(Type II error) means that the conviction (the "positive") was "false" because it resulted in
part from legal error. Both terms indicate causation: the legal error was a but for cause of
the verdict (i.e., without the legal error the opposite verdict would have resulted). In fact, it
is impossible in any particular case to know with certainty whether a given legal error was a
but for cause of a jury verdict (or other outcome). The simple risk analysis in section I
avoids this uncertainty by assuming that the trial court's ruling on a single legal issue determines the verdict, see text at note 37 (assumption 3). The possibility of "harmless" legal
error is discussed in Section V.
A probability analysis of legal error cannot say anything about factual error-the usual
context in which false positives and false negatives are discussed-without additional assumptions about the relationship between the facts and the verdict.
9 In fact, the prohibition on government appeals in criminal cases is not complete. Although the government may not appeal acquittals, prosecutors in the federal system and in
most states may appeal certain other final orders and take certain interlocutory appeals. See
notes 44, 46, 133-40 and accompanying text. Because the great bulk of legal issues that arise
in criminal cases-including evidentiary issues, criminal procedure issues that arise during
trial, and jury instructions-may not be appealed by the government, I refer simply to the
"prohibition on government appeals in criminal cases."
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shows only that, assuming courts are not otherwise biased for or
against defendants, there may nonetheless be a pro-defendant bias
in the application and evolution of legal standards. 10
Many observers of criminal trials believe that courts-judges
and juries-are often biased against criminal defendants: hostility
toward alleged criminals (by the trial courts) and convicted
criminals (by the appellate courts) may lead courts to make findings of fact or reach conclusions of law that favor the government.11 The significance of the present inquiry is not vitiated by
the fact that there may be pro-government biases in criminal litigation, including conscious anti-defendant prejudice. We must understand any pro-defendant distortion in the law caused by the
prohibition on government appeals, even if we ultimately conclude
that such distortion merely offsets other, pro-government, bias in
the evolution and application of criminal law standards.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the pro-defendant biases identified in this article simply counteract or offset possible pro-government biases. On the contrary, different types of bias may not offset
each other or may even be cumulative. Surely the conviction of an
innocent defendant because of, say, class bias is one of the most
serious errors possible in our system of justice. Yet prohibiting the
government from appealing alleged errors of law that result in acquittal does not counteract such bias. A direct means of addressing
convictions based on improper considerations would be to require
courts, trial and appellate, to undertake an independent evaluation
of the evidence and to order an acquittal where an unbiased jury
would have found a reasonable doubt. 2 In short, pro-defendant
distortions in the evolution and application of legal standards does
not necessarily negate or counteract discrimination against defendants by decision makers in the criminal justice system.
Most importantly, bias in the development and application of
legal standards changes the meaning of the law itself, for everyone.
This article suggests that asymmetric appeal rights may alter the
law through two effects: (1) trial court application of standards of
law that are more pro-defendant than required by appellate prece,I The prohibition on government appeals may, in certain circumstances or to a limited
degree, introduce a pro-government bias in legal error. See text at notes 71-75, and 98-107.
" But see also Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models
of CriminalProcedure:A Comparative Study, 121 U Pa L Rev 506, 507 (1973) (concluding
that, in general, rules of evidence and rules of criminal procedure in common law countries
introduce "barriers to conviction").
12 The Supreme Court, in fact, has held that the Due Process Clause imposes such a
requirement. See Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 318-19 (1979), discussed in note 114.
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dent; and (2) pro-defendant evolution of appellate-defined legal
standards. These effects change the content of legal standards for
all defendants, all juries, and all prosecutors, whether or not antidefendant discrimination would otherwise lead to an unjust
conviction.
Finally, I do not propose permitting the government to appeal
claims of legal error when the defendant is acquitted, even on an
advisory basis. 13 Prohibiting the government from seeking a retrial
after acquittal furthers two constitutional guarantees: the protection against being "twice put in jeopardy" of conviction and the
right to trial by jury.15 But possible by-products of the prohibition
on government appeals-pro-defendant distortion in the incidence
of the risk of legal error, and pro-defendant bias in the development and application of legal standards-are not fundamental
constitutional norms.' 6 It may be possible to permit a greater range
of government appeals in criminal cases without undermining ei13 In Canada, the appellate court has discretionary power to hear government claims of
legal error leading to an acquittal. See Alan W. Mewett, An Introduction to the Criminal
Process in Canada 209-12 (Carswell, 1988). Several states had similar rules before Benton v
Maryland, 395 US 784 (1969), interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy. Even now, at least one state, Kansas, permits
the government to appeal from an acquittal to the state supreme court if the legal issue is of
statewide interest and vital to the administration of justice. The appellate decision is only
advisory, however; even if the government's position is sustained, the trial court acquittal is
final. See 22 Kan Stat Ann § 3602(b)(1)-(3) (1988); State v Martin, 232 Kan 778, 658 P2d
1024, 1026 (1983). See also Nevada v Viers, 86 Nev 385, 469 P2d 53, 54 (1970) (striking down
a similar provision on the ground that an advisory appeal presents no case or controversy
under the state constitution).
14 US Const, Amend V. The Supreme Court derived the rule prohibiting government
appeal of an acquittal from the Double Jeopardy Clause. See cases cited in note 2. Justice
Holmes dissented from this analysis, arguing that as long as a case is on direct appeal or is
being retried, only one "jeopardy" has attached. Under this view, there is no constitutional
distinction between retrial following the defendant's appeal of a conviction and retrial following the government's appeal of an acquittal. Kepner v United States, 195 US 100, 134-37
(1904) (Holmes dissenting). It would seem, however, that one can distinguish between twice
being given an opportunity for acquittal, which the Constitution allows, and twice being
"put in jeopardy" of conviction, which the Constitution prohibits.
15 US Const, Amend VI. Reversing an acquittal would presume that the acquittal was a
"false negative" resulting from an error of law at the first trial. See note 8. However, the
jury may acquit even though it concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty; in other words, the jury may exercise its power of "nullification," which is generally
understood to be an essential, if implicit, aspect of the right to jury trial. See Jackson v
Virginia, 443 US at 317 n 10; United Brotherhood of Carpentersv United States, 330 US
395, 408 (1947). See also Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:Reflections
on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich L Rev 1001, 1012-18 (1980).
10 On the other hand, pro-defendant distortion in outcome error (often called "factual
error," see note 6) is an inevitable and hence essential aspect of the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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ther the double jeopardy prohibition or the right to jury trial.1 7 My
primary purpose here, however, is to consider possible consequences of the present structure of asymmetric appellate rights in
criminal cases. Extended discussion of the policy and other implications of this analysis, including proposals for reshaping criminal
procedure, must be left for another time.
I. THE ASYMMETRIC RISK OF LEGAL ERROR IN CRIMINAL CASES
In this section, I construct a simple model of criminal trial and
appeal that permits varying assumptions about the objectives and
decision strategies of both trial and appellate courts. My analysis is
not intended to describe the subjective thought processes of
judges; I do not claim that all judges actually regard and respond
to precedent in the manner presented. Rather, the analytical structure permits us to begin to understand the significance and possible consequences of asymmetric appeal rights in criminal cases.
My analysis differs from other models of the litigation process
in several respects. I am primarily concerned with judicial decision
making (both trial and appellate), not litigant behavior;18 I specify
the nature and source of judicial error; 9 and I examine how judicial uncertainty in the context of asymmetric appellate rights may
cause standards of law to shift systematically over time.2 °
11Proposals to increase the government's appeal rights are briefly discussed in notes
140-42.
11 Compare Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J Legal Stud 51
(1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6
J Legal Stud 65 (1977); George L. Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigation, 9 J Legal
Stud 399 (1980); Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J Legal Stud 139 (1980); and George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984). Most of my
analysis of trial court perception of legal standards is relevant also to litigant behavior,
because litigants as well as trial courts "observe" appellate decision making. In addition,
strategic litigant behavior is addressed in text at notes 76-82 and in Section IV.
19 Other analyses assume or stipulate different understandings of judicial uncertainty.
See Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin, JudicialDiscretion,9 J Legal Stud 129 (1980);
and Ronald A. Heiner, Imperfect Decisions and the Law: On the Evolution of Legal Precedent and Rules, 15 J Legal Stud 227 (1986).
2 Other analyses examine legal error (or legal uncertainty), but address different questions. See William Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J L & Econ 249, 271-72 (1976) (legal uncertainty spawns litigation,
which in time causes the law to become more precise); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Cal L Rev 1 (1983) (legal uncertainty increases over time); and John E. Calfee
and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Standards,
70 Va L Rev 965 (1984) (examining the implications of parties' uncertainty as to which legal
standards courts will apply).
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Although the present analysis concerns the criminal litigation
process, in some respects it implicates civil cases as well.2 In criminal cases, the prohibition on government appeals causes significant asymmetry in the distribution of disputes on appeal. In some
classes of civil litigation, various factors, such as differential stakes,
may cause significant asymmetry in the distribution of disputes on
appeal. 2 Any source of asymmetry in the distribution of disputes
on appeal can cause differential risk of legal error and distortion in
the development or application of legal standards.2
A.

24
The Essential Structure of Legal Error

To illustrate the consequences of asymmetric criminal
appeals, I assume that the sole legal issue 25 to be decided by the

11Appellate rights are formally asymmetric in at least one other legal regime, that governing social welfare entitlements. An administrative grant of benefits is not judicially reviewable, while a denial is reviewable. This asymmetry may have profound effects on the
amount and allocation of error. See Jerry L. Mashaw, et al, Social Security Hearings and
Appeals 136-42, 146-50 (Lexington, 1978); Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 148-49
(Yale, 1983); and Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability Insurance in an Age of Retrenchment: The
Politics of Implementing Rights, in Theodore R. Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, eds, Social
Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis 151, 162-63 (Princeton, 1988). Moreover, administrative acquiescence in an adverse appellate ruling may produce significant asymmetry in
disputes on appeal. See Samuel Estreicher and Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L J 679 (1989), and note 70.
22 There may also be asymmetry even for the limited set of criminal issues that the
government is authorized to appeal in criminal cases. See notes 134 and 138. For instance,
the statute authorizing interlocutory appeal by the government from a pre-trial suppression
order requires the United States Attorney to certify that the appeal is not taken for delay
and that the evidence suppressed is of substantial significance to the government's case. See
18 USC § 3731 (1982 & Supp 1989) (excerpted in note 134).
23 The consequences of asymmetric distribution explored in this article underscore the
special nature of the "50 percent rule" that Professors Priest and Klein derive in their
model of the relationship between settled and litigated cases. See Priest and Klein, 13 J
Legal Stud at I (cited in note 18). Priest and Klein argue that whatever the initial incidence
of disputes in relation to the decision standard, the set of cases actually litigated will, at the
limit, be symmetric around the decision standard. Id at 14-15. Their analysis suggests, however, that it is unlikely that symmetry will actually be achieved. Id at 6-30; see also note 49.
The present analysis indicates that unless the set of disputes on appeal is symmetric around
the legal standard, further development of the legal standard may be inadvertently biased.
" The Appendix presents the following analysis of legal error in a more formal, graphic
model (see Figures A-1 and A-2).
" The voluntariness of a confession may seem like a question of fact as much as one of
law, since its resolution requires the court to interpret relevant facts in the particular case.
The Supreme Court itself recently despaired of the "elusive," "complex," and "amphibian"
nature of the voluntariness inquiry, ultimately holding that for purposes of habeas appeals
in federal district courts, the state courts' determination of voluntariness is a "legal question
requiring independent federal determination," Miller v Fenton, 474 US 104, 115 (1985). Indeed, the law always is inseparable from the facts, not only where "voluntariness" is at issue
but in every legal issue that arises in litigation. I simply have chosen a legal issue for which
it is particularly obvious that "law" does not exist apart from application of the law. The
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court" in each criminal case is whether the defendant's confession
meets the standard of voluntariness required by the Constitution.27
For purposes of analysis, we may hypothesize a constructive
index of voluntariness: the higher the index value, the more voluntary the statement. At extremely high values, for instance, the defendant walked into the police station and asked for the opportunity to confess.2" At very low values, he confessed only after
repeated physical beatings or threats to arrest members of his family. 29 There is some index value that corresponds to the constitutionally required minimum amount of voluntariness. I refer to this
index value as the "constitutional standard," or, since it is derived
from appellate precedent, the "precedential standard" of law. The
appellate court may, over time, shift this standard in a pro-defendant or pro-government direction. All confessions with an index of
voluntariness greater than the precedential standard are constitutionally "voluntary," while all confessions with lesser index levels

nominal legal standard (voluntariness) is meaningless unless given content by reference, explicit or otherwise, to situations in which confessions occur (i.e., the "facts"). Despite Miller
v Fenton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit seems to be edging
toward reviewing the voluntariness issue as a question of fact, rather than law, at least in
habeas corpus cases. See Wilson v O'Leary, 895 F2d 378, 383 (7th Cir 1990), and (in this
issue) Comment, Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Corpus Proceedings:The Proper
Standard for Appellate Review, 57 U Chi L Rev 141 (1990).
28 The voluntariness issue arises in a procedural context involving only the judge, not
the jury. That is, the judge must decide whether a confession meets the constitutional standard of voluntariness. Jackson v Denno, 378 (1964). My injury and analysis apply more
generally to all legal issues, however, whatever their procedural context. Is some states, for
instance, even if the judge has determined that a confession is voluntary, the jury is permitted to consider its voluntariness (and to exclude an involuntary confession from its deliberations). See Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, I Criminal Procedure § 10.5 at 799-801
(West, Crim Practice Series ed 1984). Here the legal issue is whether the judge properly
instructed the jury on the standard of voluntariness. The judge might explain the meaning
of voluntariness by referring either to the facts of the specific case (telling the jury, "If you
believe that this-and-that happened, then the confession is voluntary") or to some external
reference point (telling the jury, "A confession is not voluntary if it was obtained, for example, by physical brutality"). I posit a legal issue decided solely by the court in order to avoid
the procedural complexity of legal issues arising in, for instance, jury instructions.
27 Since 1936, the Supreme Court has held that the introduction of a defendant's involuntary confession violates his due process rights. Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936);
and Watts v Indiana, 338 US 49 (1949). Of course, there are other requirements for admission of confessions (Mirandawarnings, for example), which for simplicity I ignore in this
analysis.
28 See, for example, Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157 (1986).
29 See, for example, Brown v Mississippi,297 US 278; and Rogers v Richmond, 365 US
534 (1961). Of course, a wide variety of factual considerations contribute to the voluntariness, or involuntariness, of a confession. It is common in economic and policy analysis to
collapse such factors into a continuum. Similar abstraction, for instance, underlies the use in
economics of "indifference curves." In the voluntariness example, we can always ask the
question: Which is more voluntary, this confession or that one?
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are constitutionally "involuntary." Of course, trial and appellate
courts do not actually index voluntariness, either for confessions
before them or for the constitutional standard. Rather, when a
court rules on the admissibility of a confession, it first recounts the
underlying facts (for instance, that the defendant was held for two
hours by interrogators who misled him and failed to offer him food
or coffee). Then the court announces whether such facts demonstrate constitutional voluntariness or involuntariness.
If courts never made errors in implicitly assigning index values
to confessions, all confessions with a greater degree of voluntariness than the constitutional standard would be admitted into evidence, while all confessions with a lesser degree of voluntariness
would be suppressed. Courts (both trial and appellate) do err, however. 30 By overestimating or underestimating the voluntariness of a
confession, a court will occasionally hold a confession with a voluntariness index below the constitutional standard to be voluntary
(committing pro-government error) and occasionally will hold a
confession with an index above the standard to be involuntary
(committing pro-defendant error). If the actual voluntariness level
of a confession is close to the constitutional standard, there is a
high likelihood that a court will err. On the other hand, where the
actual voluntariness level of a confession either greatly exceeds or
falls far short of the constitutional standard, a court will seldom
commit legal error. Stated more generally, the likelihood of legal
error increases as the distance between the actual index level of a
confession and the constitutional standard decreases. When the
true voluntariness index level of a confession approaches the constitutional standard (so that the confession is barely voluntary or
barely involuntary, relative to the constitutional standard), the
probability of legal error approaches fifty percent.
30 Because the legal system modeled in this article ascribes authoritative significance to
precedent and yet recognizes the possibility of appellate error, it is neither entirely objectivist (insisting on one objectively true answer for every legal issue) nor entirely realist (where
there is no "law" beyond the final ruling in each case). See Lea Brilmayer, Wobble, or the
Death of Error,59 S Cal L Rev 363, 389 (1986) ("Methodologically, error cannot exist in the
legal system in the commonsensical meaning of the word."). See also Joseph Raz, Legal
Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 Yale L J 823, 843-46 (1971) (the "law" provides several correct solutions, rather than a single authoritative answer, to a particular case).
In this article, I do not join the jurisprudential dispute over the coherence of the concept of "legal error" (or, indeed, the concept of "law"). I merely use words such as "legal
standard" and "legal error" to refer to particular behavioral constructs. Specifically, as note
in the text, the term "precedential standard" refers to that rule of decision implied by previous appellate rulings on the legal issue. The term "legal error" refers to a judicial decision
(trial or appellate) that is different from the decision implied by the precedential standard.
The precedential standard itself may change over time as appellate courts make rulings that
depart from prior precedent.
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A critical assumption of my analysis is that legal error in each
court, trial and appellate,3 ' is unbiased; any given judge is as likely
to overestimate as to underestimate the voluntariness of a confession in dispute, 2 and therefore is equally likely to err in favor of
the defendant or the government.3
Although other potential
sources of unbiased legal error exist, 4 I initially assume, for ease of
exposition, that the only source of legal error lies in estimating the
implicit voluntariness index of the confession before the court.
B.

The Essential Structure of Criminal Trial and Appeal

Assume:
1. A set of criminal trials in which only one legal issue is disputed: whether the confession the government seeks to introduce is
voluntary under the Constitution.' If the trial court rules that the
3' My discussion of judicial decision making assumes that appellate judges, like trial
judges, evaluate the voluntariness of every confession de novo, rather than through a Bayesian (conditional probability) approach. Under a Bayesian approach, an appellate judge
would first estimate a prior probability of constitutional voluntariness, given that the confession was admitted by the trial court. After reading the briefs, record excerpts, etc., the
appellate judge would alter this probability, yielding the posterior (or conditional)
probability. In the present context, however, the relative value of the first source of information-the trial court's holding-would appear to be small, compared to the value of considering the facts of the confession. Where the effect of the trial court's holding on the posterior probability of guilt is de minimis, we lose little in ignoring it. Most importantly, as long
as the appellate court's error function is unbiased, it does not matter for my purposes
whether this function reflects a Bayesian or a de novo evaluation of cases. See also note 71
and accompanying text (distinguishing Bayesian decision making, which is rational and unbiased, from unwarranted appellate deference to the trial court).
32 The reasons for judicial misestimation may include limits on time, ability, or resources or any other constraints resulting in unbiased but imperfect information.
SS An alternative way to specify lack of bias is to say that each trial bench and each
appellate bench is unbiased on average. Thus, while certain judges on a bench ("liberal"
judges?) might tend to assign voluntariness indices that are too low to disputed confessions,
other judges ("conservative" judges?) might tend to assign voluntariness indices that are too
high. As long as the "liberal" judges are counterbalanced by "conservative" colleagues, the
assumption of lack of bias is met.
34 For example, the trial court might misestimate the voluntariness indices of confessions discussed in appellate opinions, and therefore occasionally misperceive the constitutional standard, but always perfectly evaluate the voluntariness level in the case at hand. As
long as such misevaluation of precedent is unbiased-misevaluation in a pro-defendant direction is as likely as misevaluation in a pro-government direction-the analysis does not
change. See also text at notes 59-60, discussing another source of unbiased legal error in the
trial court.
"6 The present analysis concerns only cases where the legal issue of voluntariness is
disputed in court. Most cases involving confessions are therefore not relevant for present
purposes. These include trials where the defendant does not dispute the voluntariness of the
confession, trials where the government decides not to attempt to introduce the defendant's
confession, and the largest set of confession cases, those that never go to trial because the
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confession is voluntary, it is admitted into evidence. If the confession is ruled involuntary, it is suppressed.
2. All trials end in acquittal or conviction. 6
3. If the trial court admits the confession, the defendant is
convicted; if the 7trial court suppresses the confession, the defend3
ant is acquitted.

4. The government cannot appeal from a judgment of
acquittal. 38
5. A convicted defendant appeals. 39
6. Neither side may take an interlocutory appeal. 40 Thus, by
hypothesis, the prosecution can never appeal an adverse trial
decision.
7. When the "voluntariness" issue is raised on appeal, the appellate court either may agree that the confession is voluntary and
rule that the trial court did not err, or may conclude that the confession is involuntary and rule that the trial court did err. 41
8. If the appellate court finds no trial court error, it affirms the
conviction. Otherwise, it reverses.42
defendant and the government reach a settlement (e.g., the defendant pleads guilty to one
or more charges).
3" This assumption ignores the possibility of a hung jury, which usually results in a new
trial, and other causes of mistrial, which may or may not result in a new trial. See note 38.
37 The assumption of perfect correlation between resolution of the legal issue and trial
outcome is highly implausible for many legal issues, but it is not critical to the analysis and
is made solely in order to avoid undue complexity. See note 51. With respect to the admissibility of a confession, this assumption is, in fact, not entirely unrealistic; the Supreme Court
has held that admission of a constitutionally involuntary confession can never be "harmless"
error. See note 109.
18 See note 2. Exactly what constitutes an acquittal is a matter of some debate. The
Supreme Court has held that retrial is prohibited after a mistrial that the government provoked for strategic advantage. See Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 674, 677, 679 (1982).
Trial court dismissal of a prosecution for insufficiency of the evidence also counts as an
acquittal, even when the finding of insufficiency is attributable to an erroneous legal ruling
by the trial court. See United States v Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 US 564, 571-72 (1977);
Sanabriav United States, 437 US 54, 68-69 (1978). However, retrial is permitted after mis-.
trials due to a hung jury or other "manifest necessity." See, for example, Illinois v Somerville, 410 US 458 (1973).
39 In fact, nearly every conviction after trial is appealed in the federal system and many
state systems. See Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal at 60 (cited in
note 7) (noting that in some jurisdictions, appeals are taken in up to 90 percent of criminal
trials,apparently including in the base number trials that end in acquittal). See also 4 ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, § 21-1.1 Commentary (2d ed 1980) (noting "universal recognition" of every defendant's right to obtain appellate review). Even where appellate counsel
for an indigent defendant believes there are no non-frivilous issues on which to appeal, she
must advise the appellate court of any conceivable issue. Anders v California, 386 US 738,
744-45 (1967).
, But see notes 44-46, 134, and accompanying text.
41

See also note 31.

42

This is implied by the third assumption, which effectively posits that no error is
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9. There is one trial court and one appellate court.43
For purposes of analysis, I have assumed that the defendant
but not the government can appeal the trial court's ruling. Since
1968, the federal government has, in fact, been permitted to appeal
most trial court rulings holding a confession to be constitutionally
involuntary. In that year, Congress authorized immediate appeals
from pre-trial rulings suppressing evidence, including confessions.4 4
Because defendants are supposed to move to suppress evidence
prior to trial, 45 a trial court ruling suppressing evidence is one of
the few legal issues that the government can usually appeal.46
Nonetheless, the voluntariness issue is an attractive example for
this analysis because it is a one-dimensional, continuous legal
48
standard 47 and is decided entirely by the court.

"harmless." See note 51. The "harmless error" doctrine on appeal is considered in
Section V.
43 For purposes of the present risk analysis, it does not matter whether more than one
judge sits on each court or whether the appellate court sits in panels.
41 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 1301, Pub L No 90-351,
82 Stat 237 (1968), codified at 18 USC § 3731 (1982 & Supp 1989), and excerpted below in
note 134. The consequences of asymmetric appeal rights regarding confessions underscore
the significance of Congress's 1968 authorization of federal government appeals from pretrial orders suppressing evidence.
'5 See, for example, FRCrP 12(b)(3) and 12(f). This rule is not always enforced, however. Trial courts may be reluctant to enforce it because of concern that penalizing the
defendant for his counsel's failure to make a pre-trial suppression motion would violate the
defendant's constitutional rights. On the constitutional issues see, for example, People v
Hampton, 696 P2d 765 (Colo 1985) (vacating trial court conviction where alibi was excluded
under Colorado analogue to FRCrP 12(b)(3), and remanding for more articulated basis for
exclusion; the trial court's reinstatement of prior judgment after rehearing and application
of multi-factor balancing test was affirmed en banc, 758 P2d 1344 (Colo 1988)). And see
Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400 (1988) (permitting enforcement of rule prohibiting defense
alibi witnesses not previously disclosed to prosecution).
46 The scope of prosecutorial appeal rights varies. In all states, specific statutory authorization is required before prosecutorial appeal is permitted. See Arizona v Manypenny,
451 US 232, 249-50 (1981). As of 1984, about half the states permitted government appeals
from pre-trial suppression orders. See LaFave and Israel, III Criminal Procedure § 26.3 at
214 (cited in note 26). Some states have followed the recent federal approach of permitting
most government appeals not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id at 211; note
138.
", I have deliberately selected a legal issue for which there are, theoretically, an infinite
number of possible legal standards; that is, voluntariness is a matter of degree and the legal
standard specifies "how much" voluntariness is required. See note 29 and accompanying
text. Although the voluntariness issue is thus especially suitable for the graphic analysis in
this article, the essential logic and conclusions of the analysis apply also to discrete or discontinuous legal standards, such as the meaning of "fraud" under the federal mail fraud
statute or the meaning of "premeditation" in a murder statute. My ultimate concern is
whether the content or application of legal standards may shift in a pro-defendant direction
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C.

Asymmetry in Criminal Appeals

The Incidence of Legal Error

This section explains why, even if both the trial court and the
appellate court are unbiased, there will be an asymmetric distribution of disputes on appeal and more pro-defendant than pro-government error by the appellate court. For aid in explication, this
section provides a simple numerical example in footnotes; a
graphic model of the asymmetry in risk of legal error is provided in
the Appendix.
1. The distribution of disputes and error at trial.
To determine the overall risk of legal error in the trial court,
we must specify the distribution of disputed confessions in the
trial court: What percentage of such confessions is in fact constitutionally voluntary, and what percentage constitutionally involuntary? For ease of analysis, I assume that most disputed confessions
have an actual voluntariness level near the constitutional standard
and that equal numbers fall above and below the standard. Assuming a symmetric distribution of disputes around the legal standard
is reasonable if it is costly-and equally costly-for the defendant
and the government to engage in legal disputes. If this is so, the
defendant is unlikely to contest confessions with a high degree of
voluntariness (relative to the constitutional standard), while the
government is unlikely to introduce confessions with low indicia of
49
voluntariness.
The assumptions that the probability of error is symmetrically
distributed around the true voluntariness level and that contested
confessions are symmetrically distributed around the constitutional standard imply that the trial court will erroneously admit
involuntary confessions with the same frequency that it errone-

over time; it makes no difference whether the legal issue is discrete or is collapsible onto a
continuum.
48 See note 26.

The assumption of a symmetric distribution of disputes in the trial court permits
isolation and easy graphic depiction of the asymmetries that result from the rule prohibiting
government appeal of acquittals. This assumed symmetric distribution of disputes around
the constitutional standard is not realistic in criminal cases, however; it underestimates the
relative amount of legal error borne by the government. The distribution of legal disputes
that come to trial will bp symmetric around the legal standard only if the parties' stakes,
cost savings from settlement, and error characteristics are also symmetric. See generally
Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 6-30 (cited in note 18); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and JudicialAdministration, 2 J Legal Stud 399, 41718 (1973). These conditions are unlikely to prevail in criminal litigation. See discussion in
text at notes 76-79.
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ously excludes voluntary confessions. The government and the defendant bear the same risk of legal error at the trial level,50 and the
number of false negatives (acquittals due to legal error) equals the
number of false positives (convictions due to legal error).5 1
2.

The distribution of disputes and error on appeal.

The government cannot appeal trial court rulings suppressing
confessions. On the other hand, we have assumed that defendants
appeal all confession rulings in favor of the government. The distribution of cases on appeal is therefore identical to the distribution of confessions admitted (ruled voluntary) by the trial court.
50

An example: Suppose that the admissibility of a confession is contested in 1000 cases.

Given the assumptions of a symmetric distribution of cases and of unbiased judicial decision
making, the trial court will make 500 rulings for the government and 500 for the defendant.
Suppose further that the probability of error and the actual distribution of cases are such
that the trial court errs in 10 percent of the cases before it. (Of course, as explained in the
text following note 30, more disputes close to the standard will be decided incorrectly than
disputes far from the standard.) Given these assumptions, and if there were no appeals, the
in 50 cases.
defense and the government would each bear the risk of legal error
" Continuing the numerical example of the previous note, Box B of the matrix in Table
1 shows false negatives (acquittals due to pro-defendant legal error). Box C shows false
positives (convictions due to pro-government legal error):
Table 1
Acquittal
if error-free
trial
(500 cases)

Conviction
if error-free
trial
(500 cases)

A

B

Acquittal

450
C

Conviction

50
D

50

450

Because we have assumed a perfect correlation between the confession ruling and trial
outcome, see text at note 37 (assumption 3), there are an equal number of acquittals and
convictions in this numerical example, paralleling the equal number of suppressions and
admissions. But the assumption of perfect correlation is not critical. As long as there is a
positive correlation for each side between winning the legal issue and prevailing at trial, the
government and the defendant will each bear the same risk of legal error, and there will be
an equal number of "false negatives" and "false positives." For instance, we may alter the
risk analysis to assume that there continues to be a 100 percent likelihood of conviction if
the confession is admitted, but only a 50 percent likelihood of acquittal if the confession is
suppressed. The percentage of erroneous rulings remains at 10 percent (50 pro-defendant
errors and 50 pro-government errors), and the trial court will still admit the confession in
500 cases and suppress it in 500 cases. But the number of convictions increases to 750, and
the number of acquittals drops to 250. As the matrix below indicates, half of the trial court's
legal errors are "harmless" (i.e., they do not change the outcome of the case). Compared to
the matrix in Table 1, the number of "false negatives" (Box B) and "false positives" (Box C)
is halved.
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This distribution of cases is not symmetric around the constitutional standard; it includes many more constitutionally voluntary
confessions than involuntary confessions. The confessions on appeal have already been "screened" for voluntariness by the trial
court.5 2
Because of the asymmetric distribution of cases on appeal, the
appellate court will not make the same number of pro-defendant
and pro-government errors. Relatively few confessions on appeal
will be below the constitutional standard. The court should reverse
the conviction in all of these cases, but sometimes it will erroneously affirm (i.e., hold the confession to be voluntary). These
affirmances are pro-government errors. Many more confessions on
appeal will be above the constitutional standard. The court should
affirm all of these convictions, but sometimes it will erroneously
reverse. These reversals are pro-defendant errors. Because we have
assumed that judicial error is unbiased, with some probability of
error at all points in the distribution (except perhaps the extremes), the asymmetric distribution of cases on appeal will result
in more erroneous reversals (pro-defendant errors) than erroneous
affirmances (pro-government errors) . 3

Table 2
Acquittal
if error-free
trial
(250 cases)

Conviction
if error-free
trial
(750 cases)

A

B

Acquittal

225
D

C
Conviction

25

25

725

51 Continuing the numerical example of Table 1 in note 51, convictions occur in the 500
cases where the confession was admitted, while acquittals occur in the remaining 500 cases.
Of the 500 cases on appeal (all of the convictions), 50 involve confessions with voluntariness
levels below the constitutional standard, since the trial court incorrectly admitted these confessions, and 450 involve confessions with voluntariness levels above the standard.
The suggestion from this example that most claims on appeal are not meritorious accords with available data. The author's review of all rulings (published and unpublished) by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit over a four-month period in 1987
shows that the appellate court found error in 12 percent of the issues it addressed in appeals
from convictions, compared with 25 percent of issues addressed in civil appeals. In nearly 8
percent of criminal appeals but less than 2 percent of civil appeals, the appellate court referred to additional legal claims so lacking in merit as not to warrant discussion. Only 7
percent of criminal convictions were reversed in whole or part, compared with 28 percent of
civil judgments. See also Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal at 60
(cited in note 7) (compared to civil cases, a larger percentage of criminal appeals are "wholly
lacking in arguable merit.").
53As long as both the trial court and the appellate court never err more than 50 per-
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At the end of the journey through trial and appeal, the risk of
legal error is not apportioned equally between the government and
defendants. The government bears the risk of pro-defendant error
in the trial court, which it was not permitted to appeal, and it
bears the risk of erroneous reversal of convictions as well. The defendant, on the other hand, bears only the risk of erroneous affirmance of convictions. 4
II.

SELECTION EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL APPEALS

If trial and appellate courts were completely rational and had
no constraints on their decision-making resources, the unequal apportionment of legal error in criminal cases would not be of partic-

cent of the time-and if this is not a plausible assumption, we might as well throw darts as
have judges-the asymmetric distribution of cases on appeal will result in more pro:defendant than pro-government errors on appeal. A lower percentage of affirmances than reversals will be erroneous, but because a larger number of confessions on appeal are above the
constitutional standard, there will be a larger number of erroneous affirmances (pro-government errors) than erroneous reversals (pro-defendant errors). This phenomenon is captured
graphically in Figure A-4 of the Appendix.
54 Continuing the numerical example of note 52, assume,
for example, that in 20 percent of cases with actually-involuntary confessions the appellate court erroneously affirms
the conviction, while in 8 percent of cases with actually-voluntary confessions the appellate
court erroneously reverses. (The reason for the differing probabilities of error is that the set
of actually-voluntary confessions contains a smaller percentage of confessions close to the
standard, as explained in the previous note.) Of the 500 cases on appeal, there will be 10 (50
x .20) erroneous affirmances (pro-government errors), and 36 (450 x .08) erroneous reversals
(pro-defendant errors).
Combining these errors on appeal with the risk of error at trial yields the total risk of
error borne by each side. The defendant bears the burden of legal error in the 10 cases that
the appellate court erroneously affirms. The 36 convictions that the appellate court erroneously reverses will result in new trials at which, by hypothesis, the defendants will be acquitted (because the confessions will be excluded). Hence the government bears the burden
of legal error in these 36 cases, in addition to the 50 acquittals resulting from legal error in
the original trials. See note 50. As shown in Table 3, the matrix after appeal shows many
more false negatives (Box B) than false positives (Box C):
Table 3

Acquittal

Conviction

Acquittal
if error-free
trial
(500 cases)

Conviction
if error-free
trial
(500 cases)

A

B

490

86
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ular analytic interest. The asymmetry in criminal appeal rights
would result in relatively more pro-defendant than pro-government errors of law (and, therefore, more erroneous acquittals than
erroneous convictions), but standards of law would themselves remain constant, and both trial and appellate courts would, on average, apply the authoritative (precedential) standard of law. In this
section and Section IV, I consider how asymmetric appeal rights
may cause trial or appellate courts to apply a standard of law that
is more pro-defendant than the original precedential standard.
The present section examines several potential "selection effects" produced by the asymmetric distribution of criminal appeals; that is, several ways in which this asymmetry may distort
the application or evolution of legal standards in criminal cases. 55
A selection effect will occur only if there is some source of bias in a
court's decision-making process, but this source of bias may be inadvertent, resulting from constraints on a court's decision making
capacities. Except for such constraints, I continue to assume that
56
judicial uncertainty and judicial error are unbiased.
A.

Selection Effects in the Trial Court

A trial court or other observer of appellate opinions must infer
the constitutional standard of law from the set of appellate opinions purporting to apply that standard. This task is time-consuming if there are many relevant appellate opinions. The task is also
made more difficult by the inconsistency of appellate precedent.
This section suggests how resource constraints may introduce a
pro-defendant bias in trial court perception and application of the
legal standard.
1.

Inferring the legal standard from precedent.

Appellate precedent is inconsistent because of legal errors
made by the appellate court. A given case might be reversed, while
other cases with lower apparent voluntariness indices are affirmed.
61 A selection effect may be defined as a causal relationship between the distribution of
disputes and other variables of litigation. See Priest, 9 J Legal Stud at 399 (cited in note 18)
and Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 1 (cited in note 18). Priest and Klein are concerned
with the effect of litigation variables (including the facts, the standard of law, relative
stakes, and relative error probabilities) on the distribution of disputes. I consider this type
of selection effect, both at trial (see text at notes 76-79) and on appeal (see text at note 52
and notes 49 and 52). I am primarily concerned, however, with the opposite causal relationship: the effect of the distribution of disputes on standards of law.
56 Unbiased in this context means that on average both the trial and appellate courts
estimate the correct voluntariness index for confessions. See text at notes 31-34.
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Similarly, for any given voluntariness index level, there may be
some appellate affirmances (holding the confessions voluntary) and
some reversals (holding the confessions involuntary).
The precedential standard is that standard most consistent
with the whole range of appellate decisions; that is, the standard
that minimizes the number of apparent appellate errors. To derive
this correct standard, however, the trial court must estimate the
voluntariness index of the confession in every appellate ruling, hypothesize various possible standards of voluntariness, determine
the number of appellate rulings inconsistent with each hypothesized standard (ignoring whether an inconsistent ruling implies a
higher or lower standard), and, finally, select as authoritative the
standard that minimizes the total number of inconsistent appellate
rulings.57 At this inferred standard, there are more inconsistent reversals (pro-defendant errors) than inconsistent affirmances (progovernment errors).5 8 Yet any other standard would be inconsistent with a larger number of appellate rulings.
2.

Sampling precedent.

It is unrealistic to believe that trial courts (or other observers)
engage in this costly, complex minimization process. A trial court
may reduce its costs of interpreting precedent by considering only
a subset of relevant appellate decisions on each legal issue. Such
sampling is not necessarily a biased method of decision making. In
the context of a distribution of appellate cases that is skewed
above the original standard, however, a trial court strategy of sampling precedent will increase the frequency of pro-defendant legal
error in final judgments.
Suppose that the trial court considers only a portion of appellate precedent on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession and
then applies the standard that minimizes inconsistency among the
sampled decisions. Assuming random sampling, the court will on
" In an ideal world, the trial court could admit or suppress the confession in the next
case according to the "majority vote," so to speak, of appellate rulings on confessions at that
index level. For all indices above the precedential standard, the majority of precedent would
be affirmances, and for all indices below the standard, the majority of precedent would be
reversals. If there were enough appellate precedent at each voluntariness level, this approach would be equivalent to calculating the legal standard at which appellate inconsistency is minimized. In fact, appellate precedent is not likely to be so complete, and hence
the trial court must consider a range of precedent and the standards implied thereby. To be
certain in any given case that it is applying the correct legal standard, the trial court must
consider the whole range of appellate precedent on the voluntariness issue.
58 See text at note 53.
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average infer the correct standard-the standard actually applied
by the appellate court-from the sampled precedent. Sometimes
the trial court will infer too low (too pro-government) a standard-where, for instance, the sample contains a disproportionate
number of cases in which the appellate court made a pro-government error. In these circumstances, the trial court will apply too
low a standard of voluntariness and admit confessions that should
be suppressed. These erroneous rulings .will be appealable, however, and most of them will be reversed on appeal. (Even if the
appellate court also construes precedent by sampling, it will on average infer the correct standard, just like the trial court.) Sometimes, on the other hand, the trial court will infer too high (too
pro-defendant) a standard-for instance, where the appellate court
made a pro-defendant error in a disproportionate number of decisions in the sample. In this event, the trial court will erroneously
suppress additional confessions. These rulings will not be
appealable.
The risk analysis in Section I assumed that the only source of
error by the trial court is in estimating the voluntariness of confessions.5" A strategy of sampling appellate decisions introduces another source of error, one that arises in deriving the constitutional
standard from precedent. Assuming unbiased sampling error, the
trial court will still derive and apply the correct standard (that implied by all precedent) on average. Yet the trial court's probability
of error (of admitting involuntary confessions or suppressing voluntary ones) increases for all voluntariness levels on each side of
this standard. Because of asymmetry in the right to appeal these
additional trial court errors, the total amount and relative amount
of legal error borne by the government increases. This additional
pro-defendant bias in the risk of legal error is a selection effect of
the asymmetric distribution of disputes on appeal.
Moreover, this pro-defendant selection effect will become
stronger over time. An increase in the trial court's probability of
error in turn increases the asymmetry in the distribution of cases
on appeal, which in turn exacerbates the pro-defendant skew in
appellate error, which in turn strengthens the selection effect of
sampling precedent. At the limit and absent countervailing correction, the selection effect would increase until half of all constitutionally voluntary confessions were erroneously suppressed by the
trial court.6 0
59 See text at note 34.
60

We have assumed that the closer the actual voluntariness level of a confession is to
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3. Balancing instead of minimizing inconsistency in appellate
precedent.
We have seen that sampling precedent introduces an additional pro-defendant bias in the risk of legal error, but that it does
not bias the trial court's perception of the legal standard. On average, the trial court still perceives and applies the original constitutional standard. We now consider another selection effect of the
skew in appellate error, one that may actually cause the trial court
to perceive (and apply) a legal standard that is higher-more prodefendant-than the precedential standard.
Subsection one described the complex decision process the
trial court must use to infer the correct standard from inconsistent
appellate precedent. At the correct standard (that which minimizes
total appellate error) there are more inconsistent appellate cases
that reverse than affirm; that is, there is more pro-defendant than
pro-government appellate inconsistency. Limitations on rational
inference, due to cost constraints or to psychological barriers to accurate assessment,"1 may cause the trial court to be misled by this
asymmetry in appellate error. Specifically, bounded rationality
may cause a trial court to perceive not the standard that minimizes appellate inconsistency but the standard that balances prodefendant and pro-government inconsistency. The standard that
balances inconsistency, however, is skewed above (that is, is more
pro-defendant than) the correct standard.
The task of the trial court (or other observer of appellate decisions) is to find the precedential standard. Inconsistent appellate
decisions represent a source of uncertainty for the trial court. At
any hypothesized standard, there will be some precedent that implies a higher standard (decisions reversing where voluntariness
levels are above the hypothesized standard), and other precedent
that implies a lower standard (decisions affirming where voluntari-

the constitutional standard, the greater the probability of legal error, so that approaching
the standard itself the likelihood of error approaches 50 percent. See text following note 30.
Introducing a new source of legal error increases the court's probability of error for all voluntariness levels and hence the total proportion of wrongly decided cases. But the proportion of wrongly decided cases can never exceed 50 percent, or the court would be better off
tossing a coin than seeking to apply the precedential standard. (In terms of Figure A-2 in
the Appendix, the probability of error increases on each side of the constitutional standard;
at the limit, the probability of error would be a horizontal line at 50 percent for all voluntariness levels.)
61 See generally Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 84 (Cambridge, 1982).
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ness levels are below the hypothesized standard). The trial court
must find a way to account for such inconsistent data.
Balancing is a simple way of accounting. If the trial court can
balance every apparent pro-government error with an apparent
pro-defendant error, the decisions in effect neutralize each other.
The court can then proceed by inferring the standard (the only
standard) consistent with all remaining cases. Balancing is an intuitively attractive strategy of decision making because it proceeds
by "cancelling out" inconsistent data, permitting the trial court to
feel justified in ignoring such inconsistencies.
Like sampling, balancing inconsistent precedent is not necessarily a biased strategy of decision making. Where the distribution
of appellate cases on the voluntariness continuum mirrors the appellate court's probability of error for each voluntariness level, a
balancing approach will cause the trial court to perceive the correct
standard-that actually applied by the appellate court. For every
pro-government error made by the appellate court, there will be
one pro-defendant error. When, however, appellate disputes and
the probability of appellate error are differently distributed, balancing inconsistency becomes a biased method of decision
2
making.
We have seen that in criminal cases the distribution of disputes will be skewed above the constitutional standard, while we
have assumed that the probability of appellate error is unbiased
(that is, skewed neither above nor below the standard). As a consequence, an appellate court applying the original constitutional
standard makes more pro-defendant than pro-government errors.
If the trial court engages in a balancing approach, it will derive not
this precedential standard (at which total appellate error is minimized) but the slightly higher standard at which apparent pro-defendant and pro-government errors are equalized. At this slightly
higher standard, some appellate decisions which in fact were decided correctly are perceived to be pro-government errors, while a
lesser number of decisions which were in fact pro-defendant errors
are perceived to be correct. The standard that balances inconsistency is that at which a shift in either direction would upset the
11 This error in statistical inference that results from balancing appellate error may be
understood as an example of the more general phenomenon of erroneously assuming that
observations are "representative" of an underlying decision process. See Kahneman and
Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty at 84-85 (cited in note 61). Because of the skew in
the distribution of appellate disputes, appellate outcomes are not "representative" of the
appellate court's probability of legal error.
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equality between inconsistent appellate affirmances and inconsistent appellate reversals, not that at which a shift in either direction would increase total appellate inconsistency.13 The simple numerical consequence of balancing rather than minimizing
inconsistency is provided in the footnote; the graphic analysis is
provided in the Appendix.6
Under this approach to deriving a rule of law from inconsistent precedent, the distribution of appellate decisions is important:
there is a selection effect. Because the distribution of confessions
on appeal is skewed toward voluntariness levels above the original
constitutional standard (due to the rule prohibiting government
appeals), the standard perceived from appellate rulings under a
balancing approach is also skewed above the original standard.
Eventually, the trial court would apply an extreme pro-defendant standard.6 5 If the appellate court also balances (rather
than minimizes) inconsistency, then the precedential standard of
law would itself become the extreme pro-defendant standard. In
our example, absent a countervailing change in the distribution of
disputes or other corrective measures for limiting or reversing selection effects, this extreme standard would require suppression of
all confessions. The possible means of counteracting selection effects are discussed in Section III.
" Arguably, Professors Tribe and Finkelstein each make this balancing error in proposing a burden of proof in civil cases that equalizes-not minimizes-error for or against
plaintiffs. See Finkelstein, Quantitative Methods in Law at 59-104 (cited in note 4); and
Tribe, 84 Harv L Rev at 1349 (cited in note 4). See generally note 4.
61 In the numerical example in note 52, we saw that there are 50 confessions on appeal
with voluntariness levels below the constitutional standard, and 450 confessions with voluntariness levels above this standard. If the trial court (or other observer) were able to minimize inconsistency in appellate rulings on these cases, it would infer the constitutional standard. If, instead, the trial court perceives the standard to be that which equalizes prodefendant and pro-government appellate inconsistency, its process of inference will be
skewed in the same direction as the distribution of disputes on appeal: eighty-six of the
confessions on appeal have voluntariness levels lower than the balancing standard, while 414
have higher voluntariness levels. Hence the 'standard perceived by balancing is slightly
higher (more pro-defendant) than the standard actually applied by the appellate court. See
also Figure A-5 in the Appendix.
" After the trial court perceives a higher (more pro-defendant) standard from recent
precedent, it will apply a standard somewhere between the original standard and the higher
standard, depending on how much weight it gives recent precedent. The suppression of additional confessions will result in an even greater skew in the distribution of appeals relative
to the original standard. (This asymmetry on appeal will be still greater if the distribution
of disputed confessions in the trial court changes in response to the new standard being
applied by the trial court.) The increased skew in the distribution of cases on appeal will, in
turn, produce even greater asymmetry in appellate error-more pro-defendant error than
pro-government error. From this next set of appellate rulings, the trial court's perception of
the constitutional standard will be even higher than the original standard, and so on ad
infinitum.

1990]

Asymmetry in Criminal Appeals

25

B. Selection Effects in the Appellate Court
We have seen that selection effects may occur in the trial
cout if, given limits on its decision-making resources, the court
samples or, balances precedent rather than minimizes appellate inconsistency. Institutional considerations also may lead to selection
effects in the appellate court.
1. Pro-defendant bias.
Due to the skew in the distribution of appealed confessions,
most cases before the appellate court are voluntary relative to the
original constitutional standard. All disputed confessions have already been "screened" for voluntariness by the trial court. Yet, because of the unique character of criminal appeals, most findings
that a confession was voluntary will nonetheless be appealed. 6 If
the appellate court faithfully performs its function (of applying the
constitutional standard), it will usually affirm. The appellate court
makes a difference in a distinct minority of cases. Moreover, the
better the trial court is, the fewer the number of cases in which
appellate review will alter the outcome.
It may be too much to expect that the appellate court's evaluative and decisional processes will be unaffected by these considerations. There are several reasons why an appellate court may depart from a standard of law under which the government usually
prevails. First, the court may wrongly conclude that its persistent
pattern of affirming indicates that it is applying too low a standard. Second, and related, because the appellate court does not
review those confessions that are suppressed under the present
standard, the set of confessions that are relatively involuntary on
appeal may come to represent "involuntariness" to the court. 8
6 See note 39. There are significant incentives for appealing a criminal case that do not

exist for civil appeals, including the underwriting of lawyers' costs, see note 76, and certain
ethical obligations of defense attorneys, see note 81.
17 This phenomenon is not unlike an academic faculty, after granting tenure to nearly
all its candidates, erroneously concluding that its "standards" have slipped. The opposite
phenomenon may also occur: when the faculty denies tenure to a series of candidates, the
faculty or observers may erroneously conclude that "standards" have been raised. Of course,
it is impossible to know whether standards have changed at all without independently evaluating the strength of each tenure case.
68 Compare Mashaw, et al, Social Security Hearings and Appeals at 139 (cited in note
21) (whereas an administrative law judge (ALJ), who hears many meritless claims, can place
each "case in its proper position relative to other cases," the district judge who reviews
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Third, if the appellate court perceives its job to be finding and correcting error, it may become dissatisfied with a standard that results in relatively little error being found. These considerations
may lead the appellate court, consciously or unconsciously, to shift
the standard in a pro-defendant direction.
An appellate tendency to raise the standard of law may be especially pronounced where the trial court's probability of error decreases over time-as the precedential standard became clearer or
as the decision-making resources and quality of the trial bench are
strengthened. The appellate court should affirm in an increasing
proportion of cases, but will hesitate to do so if it wrongly assumes
that trial court decisions are no better than they were previously.
A related, but possibly more intuitive, reason appellate courts
may enunciate more pro-defendant standards of law over time is,
simply, that this is all they are formally asked to do.6 The claim
before the appellate court is always that the trial court erred in
ruling for the prosecution and against the defendant-that the
trial court defined the defendant's rights too narrowly and defined
the government's power too broadly. The appellate court does not
consider the opposite claim: that the trial court defined the defendant's rights too broadly and interpreted the government's legal
authority too restrictively. In every case on appeal, the court is
asked to impose a greater restriction on government power than
was imposed below. Particularly when reviewing competent trial
courts, appellate courts may find it psychologically difficult to
grant claims only at a percentage corresponding to the trial court's
error rate.
If an appellate court tends to move legal standards in the direction that produces more reversals, criminal standards will be affected more than civil standards. A tendency to reverse operates in
favor of the party appealing, which can be either plaintiffs or defendants in civil cases. In criminal cases, on the other hand, such a
tendency can only favor defendants.
The dynamic effect of the one-way pressure on appellate
courts also tends to move appellate law inexorably in a pro-defendenials of benefits never "sees the much larger group of stronger claims that ALJs allow";
hence, cases appear stronger on appeal than they would relative to all cases).
"' Ian R. Macneil makes the point this way:
[The prohibition on government appeals] results in an imbalance whereby reviewing
courts are under steady, relatively one-way demands to change or implement criminal
law in directions favouring the criminal defendant.... It is difficult to believe that over
a period of time this leaves the substance of legal development unaffected.
A View from the South, 7 Can Bus L J 426, 437-38 (1982-83).

1990]

Asymmetry in Criminal Appeals

dant direction. Suppose that the appellate court imposes a significant pro-government change in the legal standard. Convicted defendants will routinely appeal trial court rulings implementing the
new standard, providing the appellate court with opportunities to
rethink the change in the law or at least to adjust the standard in a
less pro-government direction. But if the appellate court imposes a
significant pro-defendant change in the law, the government cannot appeal trial court rulings implementing this new standard. Indeed, the only appeals raising the issue will be by defendants urging the court to reassert the new standard or move it even further
inthe pro-defendant direction.7" As a result, we may expect appellate courts more readily to undo pro-government than pro-defendant changes in the law.
2.

Pro-government bias.

A complete examination of the possibility of selection effects
due to asymmetry in the distribution of appeals must acknowledge
the possibility that appellate courts exhibit the opposite bias-a
tendency to affirm rather than reverse convictions-because of a
policy or practice of appellate deference toward the legal evaluations of the trial court. 1 There is some empirical evidence of such
deference, in both civil and criminal cases, from appellate opinions
that defer to trial court "discretion" on various issues of law.7 2 Appellate deference is particularly evident in matters relating to ad73
mission of evidence and conduct of trial.
70 A similar "one-way ratchet" on changes in legal standards has been attributed to the
principle that federal agencies should "acquiesce" in an adverse appellate ruling. See Estreicher and Revesz, 98 Yale L J at 744 (cited in note 21) ("[A] total bar against intracircuit
nonacquiescence would make it impossible for a circuit that at one time ruled against the
agency to continue a dialogue with circuits that subsequently ruled for the agency ...
[O]nly the circuit that ruled for the agency would be open to possible reconsideration of its
position.... [T]he one-way ratchet moves exclusively in the direction of disapproval of the
agency's action."). See also id at 738-39, 741 and note 32 (even more powerful "one-way
ratchet" would occur under a regime of intercircuit nonacquiescence).
71 I refer to unwarranted deference, not to a Bayesian reassessment of the voluntariness
of a confession that takes into account the trial court's assessment. See note 31.
712 See generally Joseph Sneed, Trial Court Discretion: Exercise by Trial Courts and
Review by Appellate Courts (unpublished presentation before the judges of the Second Circuit, Yale Law School, 1982). Judge Sneed's unusually informative survey of Volumes 658
and 659 of the Federal Reporter (Second Series) indicates that the appeals courts scrutinized trial court discretion in about one-quarter of all cases, and approved the exercise of
discretion over two-thirds of the time.
73 See, for example, United States v Lee, 846 F2d 531, 534 (9th Cir 1988). Appellate
deference to a trial court's legal evaluations is related to but must be distinguished from
appellate deference to trial court factfinding. Most appellate systems in this country have
explicit rules requiring appellate courts to adhere to trial court findings of fact that are not
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Because all trial rulings reviewed in criminal appeals were decided in favor of the government, an appellate tendency to affirm
would increase the appellate court's pro-government error.7 4 If observers (including the trial court) do not recognize and adjust for
any such tendency,75 they will infer from appellate decisions a constitutional standard below the original standard. If the appellate
court defers in each successive round of appeals, the apparent
precedential standard of law could continually shift in a pro-government direction, absent countervailing bias or correction, as discussed below.
III.

COUNTERACTING SELECTION EFFECTS

It would be difficult to test for the existence of selection effects in criminal cases. We cannot know the extent to which trial
and appellate courts (and other legal observers, most importantly
litigants) are aware of the asymmetric distribution of criminal appeals and account for such asymmetry in deriving and applying the
standards of law. It would be a great leap of faith, however, to assume that the asymmetry of disputes on appeal and the asymmetry of appellate error have no effect on criminal law standards over
time.
To avoid any selection effect, the trial court (and future appellate courts) must understand that the pro-defendant skew in apparent appellate error (more erroneous reversals than affirmances)
is not indicative of an underlying pro-defendant shift in the standard applied by the appellate court. Additionally, the appellate
"clearly erroneous." See, for example, FRCP 52(a). Unlike deference toward trial court
factfinding, which affects only the outcome of the particular case, deference toward legal
evaluations may affect the development of substantive standards of law.
Judge Sneed, in the unpublished manuscript cited in note 72, suggests that deference to
the legal evaluations of the trial court may often be inappropriate (for instance, in determining the scope of constitutional rights or in interpreting statutes), but is sometimes quite
appropriate (for instance, in determining whether a juror should have been dismissed or
whether the identity of a confidential informant should have been revealed). Sneed, Trial
Court Discretionat 3-6.
74 In civil cases, where there is a symmetric appellate distribution because either side
can appeal, a policy of deference toward the trial court will increase both pro-plaintiff and
pro-defendant error. In criminal cases, however, a policy of deference increases only the
appellate court's probability of pro-government error. In my example, the appellate court
will be more likely to affirm admission of confessions with actual voluntariness levels below
the constitutional standard, and will be less likely to reverse admission of confessions with
voluntariness levels above the constitutional standard. (The error characteristic for the appellate court in Figure A-2 in the Appendix would be symmetric not around the original
standard, but around an index level lower than the original standard.)
75 See text at notes 89-91.
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court must be willing to continue to apply standards of law under
which the government usually prevails. Finally, in inferring the
precedential standard, legal observers (including trial and appellate courts) must be prepared to discount for any appellate deference to the legal evaluations of trial courts.
Even if courts are not fully able to gauge and adjust for appellate asymmetry on a case-by-case basis, there are several ways in
which such effects may be tempered or even entirely counteracted.
This section examines how litigating attorneys (defense counsel
and prosecutors) and courts (trial and appellate) may respond to
the possibility of selection effects. First, counsel may respond strategically by seeking to alter the distribution of disputes that come
before courts. Second, trial and appellate courts themselves may
engage in periodic self-correction. Third, the effective range of disputes considered by the appellate court might be expanded
through irrelevant argument to the appellate court or dicta in appellate opinions. Finally, there may be exogenous correction by a
lawmaking institution, such as the Supreme Court or a legislature,
which is usually outside the system of criminal trial and appeal.
A.

Altering the Distribution of Disputes

If repeat litigants in criminal cases are aware of possible selection effects, they have an incentive to alter the distribution of disputes on appeal. In particular, the possibility of pro-defendant selection effects resulting from a skewed distribution of disputes on
appeal may lead prosecutors to attempt to counteract this skew by
asserting meritless claims in the trial court. In order to understand
the significance of this incentive, it is helpful first to consider the
incentives operating on defense counsel and prosecutors in the absence of selection effects.
1. The distribution of disputes without selection effects.
Even apart from consideration of selection effects, defense
counsel risk little by disputing all available legal issues at trial and
on appeal, even where the claim appears to have little merit. Defense counsel's primary disincentives to dispute legal issues are litigation costs7" and the consequences of irritating the court (or
76 The state pays the direct legal costs of defendants classified as indigent. According to
federal statistics, indigent defendants constitute approximately 75 percent of all defendants
in the federal system. Mark Silver, Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts (communication with author, December 19, 1989). The opportunity
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jury). In terms of our example, the defense has little to lose in
trying to suppress even confessions with unmistakable indicia of
voluntariness. If a clearly voluntary confession is (erroneously)
suppressed at trial, the likelihood of acquittal increases, and the
defense does not face the prospect of reversal inasmuch as the
prosecution cannot appeal. Even if the trial court refuses to suppress the confession, the defense can raise the issue on appeal and
may possibly win reversal (if the appellate court errs).7 s Once the
decision has been made to take an appeal, the incremental costs in
raising a meritless claim are relatively low. Because we may expect
the defense to dispute a legal issue even when it considers the likelihood of prevailing to be low, the set of disputes in the trial court
will include a fair number of confessions whose actual voluntariness is far above the constitutional standard.
Raising a legal claim of dubious merit imposes greater costs on
prosecutors, so that (apart from strategic response to the possibility of selection effects) we would expect the government to assert
fewer claims that it is likely to lose. In addition to litigation costs
and the consequences of irritating the court, the prosecution has
another significant disincentive to disputing a legal issue at trial:
the possibility of reversal if it prevails in the trial court. 9 The
specter of reversal is greater, of course, the more frivolous the government's legal claim. Hence, we would not expect the prosecution

costs of litigating a particular case may be significant even for public defenders and other
court-appointed attorneys, however.
7' Indeed, because defense counsel do not face the threat of reversal, there are few
structural incentives to adhere fully to rules of evidence and procedure. Even after the court
rules against defense counsel on an evidentiary issue, the threat of contempt is the major
disincentive to further disputation. See, for example, William Glaberson, Lawyers and
Judges Clash Over Contempt Citations, NY Times B3 (May 19, 1989) (describing criminal
trial in New York City in which a defense lawyer was held in contempt by U.S. District
Judge Constance Baker Motley for making impermissible arguments to the jury; Judge Motley explained, "There has to be some way to get lawyers to obey the direct orders of the
court."). In civil cases, monetary sanctions may be imposed for making claims known to
have no merit. See, for example, FRCP 11.
78 See note 39 (nearly all criminal convictions are appealed).
79 Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence results in outright acquittal. See Burks v
United States, 437 US 1, 17-18 (1978). Generally, however, reversal for legal error results in
retrial. See United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 672 (1896); United States v Tateo, 377 US
463 (1964). A retrial entails litigation costs and the possibility of acquittal. The likelihood of
acquittal is greater at the retrial because the pro-government error will not be repeated.
Additionally, the likelihood of conviction changes because witnesses disappear, their recollections fade, and each side knows more about the other's strategy and has more grist for
impeachment. These factors usually work in favor of defendants because the government
bears the burden of proof and the defense usually has few witnesses or other evidence in
criminal cases.
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to seek to introduce many confessions with low indicia of voluntariness; even if the confession were (erroneously) admitted at trial,
the resulting conviction would likely be reversed on appeal.8 0
The foregoing analysis suggests that Section I's simplifying assumption of a symmetric distribution of disputes in the trial court
is unrealistic. Rather, we should expect the distribution in the trial
court to be skewed above the constitutional standard, because the
defendant is likely to contest confessions with a high degree of voluntariness (relative to the constitutional standard), while the government is less likely to seek to introduce confessions with low indicia of voluntariness. The consequences of a trial court
distribution skewed above the constitutional standard are that: (1)
the government will prevail in most disputes in the trial court; (2)
the distribution of appellate disputes will be even more skewed
above the constitutional standard than indicated in Section I; (3)
the relative proportion of pro-defendant appellate error will be
even greater; and (4) the strength of the pro-defendant selection
effects previously identified will be magnified.
2.

Strategic response to selection effects.

Litigants (or at least attorneys) who are aware of the potential
for selection effects have an incentive to alter the distribution of
disputes on appeal by raising additional claims of dubious merit in
the trial court. Every time a defendant loses the motion to suppress a voluntary confession and raises the issue on appeal, the distribution of cases on appeal is further skewed above the constitutional standard, and resulting pro-defendant selection effects are
strengthened. Conversely, if the prosecution succeeds in introducing an involuntary confession in the trial court and the defendant
raises the issue on appeal, the asymmetric distribution of disputes
on appeal (i.e., the skew above the constitutional standard) is reduced, thereby dampening the pro-defendant selection effects previously identified.
For the individual defense attorney or prosecutor, the marginal benefit from incrementally altering the distribution of disputes
on appeal is not likely to be great. The contribution of any one
case to the distribution on appeal is insignificant, and any benefi80 The possibility that trial court legal error might be deemed "harmless" by the appellate court, and thus not warrant reversal, marginally reduces the prosecution's disincentive
to raising non-meritorious claims. See Section V. In any event, however, the harmless error
doctrine does not apply to admission of constitutionally involuntary confessions. See note
109.
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cial consequences from strengthening or weakening pro-defendant
selection effects are entirely prospective. The selection effect incentive is thus greatest for attorneys (defense counsel or prosecutors) who handle large numbers of criminal cases on a continuing
basis.
Even for individual attorneys who repeatedly engage in criminal litigation, however, it is unlikely that the selection effect incentive will result in the assertion of many additional claims. There is
a free rider problem: any benefit from altering the distribution of
disputes on appeal will be widely dispersed among all defense
counsel or all prosecutors. It is in the interest of the class of defense attorneys and the class of prosecutors to alter the distribution of cases on appeal by raising some claims that would otherwise be too frivolous to pursue, but litigation costs severely reduce
the incentive of any individual attorney to undertake this effort.
Prosecutors would appear better situated than defense counsel
to develop and enforce a mechanism for promoting their class interest. Prosecutorial offices are ready-made cartels in each judicial
district."' Conceivably, each office could determine the optimal
strategic response to selection effects and then bureaucratically enforce such a strategy by requiring individual prosecutors to bring
certain claims that would not otherwise be pursued. For the
prosecutorial office as a whole, the resulting diminution in the prodefendant skew of appellate disputes and appellate error may well
offset the present adverse consequences (i.e., the expected costs of
litigation, possibly irritating the court, and possible reversal and
retrial) of pursuing marginal claims.82 Even if such a strategic response would not be great enough to eliminate asymmetry in the
appellate distribution of cases, it would at least temper the prodefendant selection effects produced by the asymmetric appellate
structure in criminal cases.
81It is possible, of course, that defense attorneys might engage in non-explicit but consciously parallel strategic responses to selection effects. Moreover, one may view ethical
strictures on the criminal defense bar as encouraging claims that lack merit, but benefit
defense attorneys as a class by increasing the asymmetry in the distribution of cases on
appeal and producing pro-defendant selection effects. See, for example, 4 ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, §21-1.1, Commentary (cited in note 39); Anders v California,386 US
738; and ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (1987) ("A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous. . .. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding... may nevertheless
so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.").
82 It would be difficult to prove the existence of such a strategy. Whenever the prosecution argues to a trial court that the precedential standard of law should be altered, it is
implicitly acknowledging that its legal position is not meritorious under the present standard. In making such a claim, the prosecution seeks to alter the distribution of disputes that
will come before the appellate court.
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B. Self-Correction of Selection Effects
If the legal standard applied by the courts continues to evolve
over time in either a pro-defendant or pro-government direction,
the trial or the appellate court might notice a significant change in
the law and attempt to correct it. Self-correction does not require a
court to understand the nature or cause of the shift in the legal
standard; the court need only recognize that the standard is significantly higher than it used to be and resolve to apply the previous
standard. Much self-correction can be achieved without any
change in the basic structure of judicial decision making. The appellate court can expressly overrule its own recent decisions, and
either court can give greater weight to distant precedent than to
recent precedent.
Significantly, however, where the pro-defendant shift in the
standard occurs only at the trial court level, and the trial court
does not correct itself, appellate court rulings applying the correct
standard will not be sufficient to get the trial court back on track.
As the standard applied by the trial court shifts further-in a prodefendant direction, the trial court will suppress more confessions.
Defendants will appeal only confessions that are admitted under
this shifted standard-confessions with high levels of voluntariness. The appellate court, applying the correct standard, will simply affirm almost all cases. This analysis suggests that maverick
trial court judges who refuse to apply the perceived legal standard
are critical to the judicial decision-making process in criminal
83
cases.
C.

Irrelevant Appellate Argument and Appellate Dicta

In criminal cases the government often engages in a strategy
that counteracts, to some extent, the asymmetric distribution of
disputes before the appellate court. The government knows that
the appellant's briefs and claims of error on appeal will show the
appellate court only instances in which the trial court ruled in
favor of the government. 4 To counteract the impression that the
'3 For

a slightly different statement of this point, see text at note 136.
Of course, if the appellate court reads the entire record in a case, it will discover
claims decided adversely to the prevailing party. Generally, however, the readily available
record on appeal (contained in appendices to the briefs) includes only portions relevant to
the appealed claims.
84
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trial court might have been biased against the defendant, the government's response brief often cites adverse trial court rulings. For
instance, the government might mention that the trial court excluded a government witness, permitted cross-examination of another witness that the government had urged was tangential, or
included a limiting instruction opposed by the government. 5
Whatever its motivation, this style of responsive argument expands the range of disputes about which the appellate court is
informed.
In terms of our example, the appellate court rules only on disputed confessions that the trial court has allowed into evidence.
There are other cases, however, where the trial court suppressed
confessions. If these other cases end in conviction, various legal issues will be raised on appeal, and in its response briefs on these
other issues the government may note that the trial court ruled
against it on the confession issue. This practice alters the distribution of contested confessions that come to the attention of the appellate court to include a greater number of cases where the confession is below the constitutional standard. The appellate court is
thereby explicitly informed that many disputed confessions are
suppressed under the present standard of law, and this knowledge
may counteract any tendency by the court to raise the standard. 6
The appellate court itself may attempt to counteract the
asymmetry in criminal appeals through strategic use of dicta in its
opinions. Suppose that for every issue on appeal the appellate
court not only describes the factual context and ruling for the
claim at hand, but also provides a hypothetical fact situation on
which it would rule differently. For instance, the court might rule
that the confession in the present case is constitutionally voluntary, but note that if some fact or set of facts were different, the
confession would be held involuntary. In effect, every appellate decision would simultaneously affirm and reverse through the use of
8 See, for example, Government's Brief in Response at 21, in United States v
D'Amato, No 83-1097 (2d Cir 1983) (trial court refused to permit government to call certain
witnesses); Government's Brief in Response at 31 in United States v Gilboe, No 81-1481 (2d
Cir 1982) (noting that appellant had failed to mention that trial court granted defense request for adjournment of trial); Government's Brief in Response at 54-55 in United States v
Ferrara,No 82-1127 (2d Cir 1983) (noting that court twice refused to restrict defense counsel's cross-examination before finally doing so); Government's. Brief in Response at 30,
United States v Levy, No. 88-1062 (2d Cir 1988) (presenting statistical table of trial court
rulings in favor of the defendant during the testimony of a key government witness, in response to defendant's argument on appeal that the trial court had acted improperly in itself
questioning witness).
8 See text at notes 67-70.
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dicta, though one ruling would be an affirmance or reversal of a
hypothetical case.8 Just as most actual disputes are above the legal standard, most dicta would pertain to hypothetical disputes below the standard, thereby counteracting the asymmetry that results from the prohibition on government appeals.
As odd as this may sound when stated so explicitly, it is not
unusual for appellate opinions to follow this form, suggesting circumstances in which the appellate ruling would be different or
specifying the limits of the court's reasoning.8 8 Observers of appellate opinions thus have an enlarged number of data points from
which to infer the precedential standard, and a range of appellate
decisions (real or hypothetical) that is more symmetrically distributed around the constitutional standard. This analysis of the value
of dicta suggests that a court may more effectively perform its lawdeclaring function when it not only rules on the particular legal
issue before it but also indicates the limits of its ruling.
Explicit acknowledgment by the appellate court of the occasions on which it is deferring to the legal evaluations of the trial
court may also curtail a pro-government selection bias.8 9 If the appellate court signals in its opinion that it is deferring to the trial
court on a close issue of law, observers are able to discount the
decision's precedential significance. Observers will infer the precedential standard not from the formal ruling, which affirms the trial
court, but from the implicit ruling absent appellate deference. Indeed, the evidence that suggests appellate courts often defer to

87 This category of dicta (hypothesizing a converse case) must be distinguished from
dicta of another sort: where the court decides a case on one ground (for instance, on a
procedural issue) but includes in the appellate opinion a discussion and (in effect) an advisory ruling on some other ground (for instance, a substantive question of law). See, for example, New Era PublicationsInternationalv Henry Holt & Co., 873 F2d 576, petition for
reh'g denied, 884 F2d 659 (2d Cir 1989) (appellate court affirmed ruling in copyright infringement case in favor of defendant on ground that plaintiff's suit was barred by laches,
but included fifteen page discussion concluding that defendant had violated copyright law).
Such dicta does not counteract the effects of asymmetry in the distribution of appellate
cases.
88 See, for example, United States v Valencia, 826 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1987) (holding
that in this case government could not introduce statements made by defense counsel in
effort to secure bail, but indicating that such admissions could be introduced when critical
to proving element of crime); United States v Camarata, 828 F2d 974, 978 (3d Cir 1987)
(intimating that court would rule differently under specified different facts); United States
v Thomas, No 89-1262, slip op at 1013 (2d Cir, Jan 8, 1990) (noting what additional facts
would be needed to sustain government's claim of exigent circumstances dispensing with
need for warrant); United States v Fornaro, No 89-1306, slip op at 1101 (2d Cir, Jan 11,
1990) (suggesting what types of additional facts would be needed to sustain claim).
89 See text at notes 71-75.
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trial court legal evaluations9" also suggests that such deference
does not lead observers to infer too pro-government a standard
from such precedent. An explicit policy of deference increases the
total amount of pro-government appellate error, but will not impart a continuous pro-government bias in the standard implied by
appellate decisions. Consequently, a policy of deference to trial
courts serves as but a limited brake on the pro-defendant biases
identified previously."
D.

Exogenous Correction of Selection Effects

If correction occurs at neither the appellate nor the trial court
level, evolution of the legal standard in either a pro-defendant or a
pro-government direction may be tempered or reversed by exogenously imposed corrections, such as statutory clarification or Supreme Court rearticulation of the original standard. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's continuous review of petitions for certiorari permits it to keep abreast of unwarranted evolution of legal standards
in the lower courts, and its discretionary jurisdiction allows it periodically to step in and re-adjust standards of law.
IV.

INCENTIVES FOR TRIAL COURT ERROR

We have thus far assumed that the trial court has only one
objective: to apply the legal standard derived from appellate precedent. The previous sections showed that even under this assumption, the structure of criminal appeals may cause perception or application of the legal standard to evolve in a pro-defendant
direction.
If we relax the assumption that the trial court seeks only to
apply the precedential standard, additional biases are introduced.
In particular, if the trial court also seeks to avoid reversal, the prohibition on government appeal of acquittals provides an incentive
to make pro-defendant errors. This incentive may conceivably be
90 Judge Sneed's survey of Volume 658 of the Federal Reporter (Second Series) found,
that in 60 percent of the cases where the appellate court scrutinized trial court discretion,
the appellate court explicitly stated that the standard of review was "abuse of discretion" or
some variant thereon, while in the remaining 40 percent of cases the abuse of discretion
standard was applied sub silentio. Sneed, Trial Court Discretion (cited in note 72); see also
notes 72 and 73.
91 In this way, an appellate tendency to affirm is like the "harmless error" rule, discussed in Section V: 1) it increases total uncorrected pro-government error, but it does not
necessarily change the legal standard implied by appellate precedent; and 2) it reduces the
pro-defendant bias that would otherwise result from a trial court objective of avoiding reversal. See text at notes 119-21.
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limited in some circumstances by a competing incentive to preserve legal rulings for appellate review.
A.

Reducing the Risk of Reversal

Judges do not like to be reversed. e2 In civil cases, the trial
court always bears some risk of reversal, because every legal issue
is potentially appealable by the losing party. In civil cases, therefore, when the trial court does not know which party will prevail, a
trial court seeking to avoid reversal will apply the precedential
standard, so long as the appellate court is expected to continue to
apply that standard.9 3
In criminal cases, on the other hand, the trial judge can completely avoid any risk of reversal by ruling against the government.
In a system that absolutely bars any prosecution appeals, even by
mandamus,94 a trial court seeking to minimize reversal would rule
for the defendant on all contested legal issues. If the trial then ended in acquittal (and, presumably, ruling for the defendant would
increase the likelihood of this outcome), the legal issues could not
be appealed. If the trial ended in conviction, the defendant would
have nothing to appeal, since he prevailed on all legal issues
95
below.
The trial court would adopt the extreme practice of always
ruling for the defense only if its sole objective were to avoid risk of
reversal. Of course, trial courts have other objectives and concerns.
First, there is the possibility of mandamus, which is even more injurious to reputation than is reversal. If a trial court applied an
extreme pro-defendant decision rule, the appellate court could be
expected to issue writs of mandamus enjoining such rulings. More9' Most participants in and observers of trial courts perceive reversal to be a major
concern of trial judges. See Higgins and Rubin, 9 J Legal Stud at 130 (cited in note 19); and
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 506 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1986).
93 A trial judge who knows which party ultimately will prevail at trial-a more likely
phenomenon in bench, as opposed to jury, trials-can avoid reversal by always ruling
against that party on legal issues. More generally, in civil and criminal cases alike, the trial
court reduces the risk of reversal by ruling in favor of the side that is likely to lose in the

trial court.
" Mandamus is an extraordinary interlocutory writ which the appellate court may issue
against the trial court in order to enjoin egregious error, even though the party seeking the
writ has no right to interlocutory appeal. See FRAppP 21.
,5 As Glanville Williams succinctly explained, "In an effort to minimize this danger [of
reversal of conviction], the trial judge will incline to exclude relevant evidence for the prosecution where its admissibility is doubtful, while giving great latitude to the defence. This
one-sided treatment of the evidence itself helps to secure acquittals." The Proof of Guilt at
327 (Stevens & Sons, 3d ed 1963).
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over, the trial court's own conception of its role as a tribunal
bound by appellate law, its desire for fairness or justice in particular cases, and, ultimately, the fear of disciplinary action or removal
make indulgence in such an extreme practice unlikely.
Nevertheless, a trial court's desire to avoid reversal may have
profound consequences in criminal cases. Trial courts can significantly reduce the risk of reversal through a decision rule far less
extreme than the one described above. The trial court can rule for
the defense on all questions of law that are "close"-where, in the
trial court's view, the prosecution barely meets the legal standard.
Under this approach, the trial court will apply a standard of law
that is slightly higher (more pro-defendant) than the precedential
standard. As the trial court applies a higher standard, it will admit
fewer confessions, meaning that fewer disputes will be appealed
and the appellate distribution will be more skewed above the original standard. One may believe that a judge who succumbs to fear
of reversal by deliberately erring for the defense is not acting properly. 6 Whatever one's distaste for this topic, however, the incentive to favor the defense is an unavoidable consequence of asymmetry in criminal appeals,97 and it should not be ignored in
evaluating our present structure of criminal litigation.
B.

To Avoid Reversal or to Avoid Uncorrected Error?

Professor Mirjan Damaska has pointed out that in criminal
cases there may be an opposing-pro-government-bias if "judges
tend to rule in favor of the prosecution in close cases so as to preserve reviewability of their rulings."9 8 Preserving reviewability also
preserves reversibility. Hence the tendency hypothesized by Professor Damaska is at odds with the tendency discussed in the preceding section.
91This point has been made elsewhere with greater vigor. See Justin Miller, Appeals by
the State in CriminalCases, 36 Yale L J 486, 511 (1927) ("The weak, spineless trial judge is
able to hide his weakness in a record upon which the state has no appeal."); and Lester B.
Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 55-76 (Little, Brown, 1939) (arguing, inter alia, that
"the kind of judge who rules for the defendant merely to play it safe has no place on the
bench," id at 75).
97 Justin Miller also acknowledged: "As a matter of practice and experience, it can
fairly be said that some trial judges do undoubtedly and deliberately weigh the scales in
favor of the defendant. Such a judge knows that if he rules for the defendant on all doubtful
points and gives every instruction offered to him, he will be safe from reversal."Appeals by
the State in Criminal Cases, 36 Yale LJ at 511 (cited in note 96). See also id at 508-11
(discussing other aspects of "demoralization" caused by one-sided appeals).
91 Damaska, 121 U Pa L Rev at 520 n 22 (cited in note 11). As fas as I am aware,
Professor Damaska is the first to note the possibly competing incentives for pro-defendant
and pro-government error, both resulting from the asymmetry in appeal rights.
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A trial court will seek to preserve a legal issue for appellate
review if the appellate court is less likely to err than the trial
court" (or, at least, the trial court believes it is),l00 and the trial
court wants to avoid the injustice of uncorrected legal error affecting a final judgment. The only way the trial court can preserve an
issue for appellate review in a criminal trial is to rule for the government. Of course, just as the trial court would never adopt the
extreme practice of minimizing the risk of reversal by ruling for
the defendant on all contested legal issues, so it would never adopt
the extreme approach of minimizing the risk of uncorrected legal
error by always ruling for the government. Adoption of such an
extreme decision rule is quite inconsistent with the trial court's
conception of its role in a hierarchical system and its commitment
to the rule of law.
The rule prohibiting government appeals, then, creates an incentive for pro-defendant bias if the trial court seeks to avoid reversal, and an opposing incentive for pro-government bias if the
trial court seeks to avoid error in final judgments. In order to determine which of these opposing tendencies is stronger, lt us suppose that the trial court pursues all three objectives identified in
this article: applying the precedential standard of law (the primary
objective), avoiding reversal (a competing secondary objective),
and avoiding uncorrected legal error (another secondary objective).
Graphic depiction of a hypothesized distribution of cases in the
trial court, Figure I below,1 01 will aid in examining the interaction
of these incentives.

"'

An appellate court might be less likely to make legal errors than a trial court because
appellate judges have more resources (time, staff, and soon) to invest in arriving at correct
rulings, and because appellate courts usually sit in panels of three or more judges.
It might be thought that there is no reason for a system of appeal unless the risk of
legal error is less on appeal than at trial. In fact, the decision whether to have a system of
appeal is more complicated than simply comparing error rates in the trial and appellate
systems. In addition to its role in correcting legal error, an appellate court may ensure some
uniformity in error. If the nature of legal error is more uniform across appellate panels than
across the trial bench, a system of appeal reduces disparity in legal error, which may be
valuable in its own right.
1I find it highly implausible that trial courts generally believe that appellate courts
are better at deciding issues of law-that, on average, appellate courts will "correct" trial
rulings. For the sake of argument only, I ignore this objection.
101 This hypothesized distribution is the same as the outer curve of Figure A-3 (the
distribution of disputes in the trial court) in the Appendix.
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Figure I:
Distribution of Confessions in the Trial Court
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The competing objectives of avoiding reversal and avoiding
uncorrected legal error are both strongest when the legal issue is
close (Areas B and C of Figure I) and is likely to affect the verdict. 102 Because these secondary objectives are competing, they
may merely cancel each other out, so that, even for disputes that
are close and critical, the trial court will seek only to apply the
authoritative legal standard. There are at least two reasons, however, to suppose that the two secondary objectives are not entirely
commensurate and thus not entirely offsetting. Each consideration
suggests that the tendency to avoid reversal will dominate.' 03 First,

In the areas marked A and D of Figure I, where the confession is clearly voluntary
or clearly involuntary (relative to the precedential standard), the trial court will simply seek
to apply that standard, as explained previously in the text. In Area B, most of the confessions will appear to be voluntary. Yet if the trial court admits the confession, and the result
is conviction, the appellate court may reverse on appeal. Hence, the trial court may be
tempted to rule for the defendant in order to avoid reversal. Yet ruling for the defendant
(suppressing the confession) would increase the risk of uncorrected error in a final judgment
of acquittal. In Area C, on the other hand, most of the confessions will appear to be involuntary. Yet if the trial court suppresses the confession and the result is acquittal, there will be
no appellate review of the correctness of the trial court's ruling. For this set of cases, then,
the trial court may be tempted to rule for the government (admitting the confession) in
order to avoid error in a final judgment of acquittal. Yet ruling for the government would
increase the risk of reversal.
1os If, as suggested in note 100, trial courts do not believe that appellate courts err less
often than trial courts, then the incentive for pro-defendant error would predominate in all
102

cases.
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preserving close rulings for review (by ruling for the government
even though the defendant's position appears to have more merit)
entails significant costs. The parties and the appellate court will
bear litigation costs on appeal, while the parties and the trial court
itself will bear them on retrial. 0 4 Consideration of these costs on
the criminal litigation process will weigh against purposely erring
for the government.
Second, apart from transactions costs, the two secondary objects respond to incommensurate harms. On close issues of law, any
error by the trial court is a "small" error (i.e., the trial court admits a confession in Area C or suppresses a confession in Area B).
But the harm resulting from the legal error is not necessarily small.
We have seen that the reason a trial court might tend to rule for
the government in close cases is to avoid uncorrected legal error
leading to a final judgment of acquittal. Hence, the harm from a
pro-defendant legal error is the magnitude of injustice if acquittal
results. But it would seem that precisely because the legal issue is
close (in Areas B or C), the magnitude of injustice in any resulting
acquittal cannot be great. From the trial court's perspective, these
confessions are at best barely voluntary; the government at best
almost violated the defendant's rights. Hence, where the trial
court's possible pro-defendant error is small (because the issue of
law is close), the potential harm (injustice) 10 5 is small as well.
The harm from a pro-government legal error, on the other
hand, is not correlated with the magnitude of the legal error. If the
trial court errs in admitting a confession, the potential harm is reversal, which does not come in differing magnitudes. The harm
from reversal may well be the same whether the error of law was
"small" or "large." 10 6 For disputes that it perceives to be in Area C

'" The trial court bears no similar transaction costs if it errs for the defendant. Where
pro-defendant error results in acquittal, however, the government bears the burden of sunk
investigation and prosecution costs.
105 1 mean a concept of justice that is formed exclusively by legal standards. If standards of law are the measure of justice, then making a "small" legal error (ruling against the
government on a set of facts that barely meets the legal standard) is unjust, but not as
unjust as making a "large" legal error (ruling against the government on a set of facts that
overwhelmingly exceeds the standard).
If a judge's concept of justice is formed in part by measures independent of legal standards, then a "small" legal error might lead to great injustice. For instance, a judge might
think that it is "just" to introduce a confession that is reliable, whether or not it is also
voluntary. Such a judge might perceive even a small pro-defendant legal error on the voluntariness issue to be a great injustice, because it prevents admission of a reliable confession.
Of course, such a judge would also perceive injustice even when he makes no legal error (i.e.,
when he suppresses a reliable but constitutionally involuntary confession).
'0' Conceivably, the trial judge who suffers reversal may be comforted by the knowledge
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(barely involuntary), it is unlikely that a court would nonetheless
favor the government. A trial court would have a strange conception of justice and of its role if it purposely erred for the government to avoid an "unjust" acquittal, when the expected consequence of such error is reversal and then retrial at which acquittal
is more likely. 10 7 On the other hand, for disputes that it perceives
to be in Area B (barely voluntary), a court might well decide to err
for the defendant, which avoids all harm of reversal by increasing
the potential of a small injustice. The incentive for pro-defendant
error increases as the dispute in Area B approaches the constitutional standard.
The foregoing suggests that Professor Damaska's insightthat trial courts might consciously err in favor of the government
in order to avoid legal error in final judgments-is not generally
plausible. The incentive for pro-defendant error-avoiding reversal-would seem to outweigh any incentive for pro-government error on close legal issues, particularly where reversal of the pro-government ruling would require retrial. For disputes that are not
close, on the other hand, neither incentive is likely to cause the
trial court deliberately to err.
The insight is nonetheless critical in one set of cases: those
where the law is highly uncertain or the issue is novel. In Figure I,
the trial court cannot easily place these cases either far from the
standard (Areas A and D) or close to the standard (Areas B and
C), because it simply does not know what the standard is. If the
trial court rules for the defendant (proceeding as if the dispute
were in Area C or D), it will avoid reversal, but the result could be
significant injustice (where the dispute in fact falls within Area A).
On the other hand, if the trial court rules for the government, its
decision may be reversed, but appellate review and possible retrial
will prevent significant injustice in the final judgment. Hence, for
novel or difficult-to-categorize legal issues, the asymmetry in criminal appeal rights may indeed lead the trial court to err for the government, not to minimize error under a prevailing appellate standard, but to obtain authoritative delineation of the standard.

that his legal error was "small" (i.e., the confession was barely in Area C). If the harm from
reversal is to the judge's reputation, then explicit appellate recognition of the "small" nature of the judge's legal error might ameliorate this harm, assuming that reputational
sources read the whole appellate opinion. See also note 121 and accompanying text.
107 See also note 79 (likelihood of conviction is usually reduced on retrial).
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V.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF "HARMLESS ERROR"

Previous sections have alluded to the concept of "harmless error": legal error by the trial court that does not affect the verdict.108 This concept is critical in appellate review. Where the
harmless error rule applies, the appellate court will affirm a trial
court judgment that contains legal error if the appellate court
deems the error to have been "harmless." The harmless error rule
might seem to alter significantly the preceding analysis of pro-defendant bias in legal error.10 9 This section explains why the rule
does not in fact undermine the analysis. The harmless error rule
increases the total amount of pro-government legal error uncorrected on appeal but does not greatly increase the number of false
positives and is not likely to introduce a pro-government bias in
the evolution or application of legal standards by trial and appellate courts. Indeed, the rule may permit evolution of more pro-defendant legal standards.
A. The Meaning of Harmless Error
Prior to the twentieth century, almost all errors identified on
appeal from civil or criminal cases required new trials, even when
the error only insignificantly prejudiced the affected party. Since
the beginning of the century, all fifty states and the federal system
have adopted the harmless error doctrine by statute or rule;110 the
Supreme Court has held that the doctrine can apply to constitutional as well as other errors."'

"ISee notes 8, 51, 80, and 91.
The short answer to this observation is the Supreme Court's holding that the harmless error rule does not apply to the particular example I have used to illustrate the analysis:
involuntary confessions. Payne v Arkansas, 356 US 560, 567-69 (1958). The harmless error
rule cannot be ignored, however, because it does apply to most detected legal error on
appeal.
110 See, for example, FRCrP 52(a).
"
Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 21-22 (1967). There is a small class of constitutional errors to which the doctrine does not apply. These errors require reversal in the absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendant; for most of these, an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice exists. See, for example, Rose v Clark, 478 US 570 (1986) (racial
discrimination in selection of grand jury foreman); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)
(denial of right to counsel); Payne v Arkansas, 356 US 560 (1958) (coerced or involuntary
confession). See also Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254, 260-64 (1986) (racial discrimination in
selection of grand jury compels dismissal of indictment); Gray v Mississippi, 481 US 648
(1987) (harmless error rule does not apply to unconstitutional exclusion of juror); and
United States v Strunk, 412 US 434 (1973) (denial of constitutional right to speedy trial
held not subject to harmless error rule even when no prejudice results). In addition, there
are other constitutional errors, mostly derived from the Due Process Clause, for which proof
of prejudice is an element of the violation itself. Such errors presumably can never be
109
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The harmless error doctrine requires an appellate court to
consider the effect of an identified error on the judgment of the
trial court, usually the jury verdict in a criminal trial. For criminal
cases, there has been much controversy over the proper standard
to apply in determining whether the error's impact on the judgment was so slight as to be "harmless." Stated in terms of
probability analysis, an error is harmless if there is a likelihood of
at least "z" that the defendant would have been convicted on the
other evidence in the case, 112 with th
the number assigned to "z" being the major point of contention.
For our purposes, precise specification of the standard is not
necessary; it is enough to know that, as actually applied by appellate courts, the doctrine is quite powerful. That is, the harmless
error rule causes the appellate court to affirm a substantial number
of convictions despite pro-government error below."13 Most legal
errors, constitutional and non-constitutional, do not automatically
result in reversal and retrial. Whether the appellate court reverses
depends on the strength of the government's remaining evidence in
the case; that is, the probability of conviction absent the error." 4
B. The Risk of Error with a Harmless Error Rule
The simple risk analysis presented in Section I did not admit
the possibility of harmless error because it assumed a perfect correlation between prevailing on the issue of law and prevailing at
"harmless." Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Strickland v Washington,466
US 668 (1984); and the majority and concurring opinions in Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475
US 673 (1986).
.12
An alternative way to state the harmless error inquiry in terms of probability analysis is that the appellate court must consider the extent to which the error increased the
probability of conviction. For purposes of this article, it does not matter how the probability
issue is stated. I have formulated the harmless error rule in the way that most courts actually apply it. By and large, courts only consider the strength of the remaining evidence of
guilt. This approach is consistent with a Bayesian approach to harmless error. See Daniel J.
Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless Error, 5 J Legal Stud 121, 127 (1976).
"I The author's review of Second Circuit criminal law rulings over a four-month period
in 1987 (127 issues discussed in a total of 54 cases) revealed that the appellate court found
trial court error in 12 percent of the issues; yet the court also found over 60 percent of these
errors to be "harmless." See also notes 52 and 124.
14 The
question whether to reverse because of a pro-government legal error (i.e.,
whether the error is harmful) is different from the question whether the evidence in a case is
constitutionally sufficient for conviction. The constitutional sufficiency standard is whether
a "reasonable" jury could have convicted. Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). This
standard clearly establishes a lower threshold of proof than the harmless error test. If an
error is not harmless, the defendant stands trial again. If the evidence was constitutionally
insufficient, on the other hand, the case must be dismissed. See note 79.
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the trial itself.115 This assumption implied that trial court pro-government error-admitting constitutionally involuntary confessions-could not be harmless. Given this assumption, the earlier
analysis further assumed that the appeals court would reverse in
all cases infected by pro-government error." 6
Introducing the possibility of harmless error requires some adjustment of the previous analysis. In the analysis presented in Section I, the defendant bears the risk of pro-government error in the
trial court only when the appellate court fails to detect such error.
With a harmless error rule, the defendant bears the risk of progovernment error even in some cases where the appellate court detects the error-specifically, in those cases where the likelihood of
conviction absent the error exceeded "z." Hence, if the appellate
court applies a harmless error rule, the defendant bears the risk of
pro-government error in more cases.
Not all of these additional affirmances are false positives, however. They are false positives only when the appellate court
wrongly determines that an error was harmless, i.e., when the defendant would have been acquitted in the absence of the legal error. As previously noted, reversals for pro-government legal error
result in new trials, some of which will end in conviction even
though the pro-government error that tainted the first trial has
been eliminated."17 The total number of additional false positives
resulting from the harmless error doctrine depends, first, on the
probability standard of harmless error-that is, how high "z"
is-and, second, on how accurately the appellate court applies this
probability standard. If "z" is close to 100 percent, the appellate
court will not deem an error harmless unless it estimates that the
likelihood of conviction on the remaining evidence is close to 100
percent. Under this strict harmless error standard, many convictions will be reversed on appeal for legal error at the first trial, but8
most of these defendants will also be convicted at a second trial."
As "z" decreases the defendant bears a greater risk of false positives: the appellate court affirms more convictions (some of which
were false positives), and a larger proportion of reversals result in
acquittal at the second trial.

,,5See text at note 37 (assumption 3).
1,6See note 42 and accompanying text (assumption 8).
'1
See note 79 and accompanying text.
I'8 However, the probability of conviction at the second trial may be less than it would
have been at the first trial absent the error. See note 79.
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The harmless error doctrine is a rule of judicial economy; it
curtails new trials that are likely to end in the same result as the
first trial. In both the civil and criminal contexts, the rule inevitably means that appellate courts will affirm some cases that in fact
would end differently on retrial absent the original error. In the
criminal context, the doctrine benefits only the government because only pro-government verdicts can be appealed to begin with.
Still, the rule does not equalize the overall risk of legal error in
criminal cases; while it increases the extent to which the defendant
bears the risk of pro-government trial court error, it must be
remembered that the government, because it cannot appeal, necessarily bears all risk of pro-defendant error in the trial court.
C. Harmless Error and the Legal Standard Applied in the Trial
Court
The foregoing section confirms the common-sense understanding that the harmless error doctrine somewhat increases the risk of
pro-government legal error in final judgments of conviction. We
now consider whether the doctrine also introduces a pro-government distortion in the actual standard of law applied by trial
courts.
1. Assuming that trial courts seek only to apply the authoritative legal standard.
If trial court judges seek only to apply the precedential legal
standard, the harmless error rule will not cause the trial court to
apply a more pro-government standard than it otherwise would.
The harmless error rule does not affect the trial court's perception
of that standard.
Even with a harmless error rule, the appellate court must first
determine and state whether the prevailing legal standard was satisfied in the case. The harmless error rule means only that, on
some occasions, the court will affirm the conviction even though it
finds that the standard was not satisfied. Since the trial court infers the standard from appellate rulings (not judgments of affirmance or reversal), it will continue to apply the same standard even
with a harmless error rule.
2. Assuming that trial courts also seek to avoid error in final
judgments and to avoid reversal.
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If we recognize secondary trial court objectives of avoiding error in final judgments and avoiding reversal, 119 the analysis becomes more complex, but the conclusion is not materially different.
Where the trial court has these secondary objectives, it faces the
conflict described in Section IV: favoring the government would
preserve its ruling for appeal if the trial ends in conviction, while
favoring the defendant would prevent reversal no matter how the
case ends. Section IV concluded that the desire to avoid reversal
will predominate.
The harmless error rule does not greatly change this analysis
because these secondary objectives are most relevant precisely
where errors are unlikely to be harmless (i.e., where the rule does
not come into play). Any trial court incentive to favor the government, in order to avoid error in a final judgment of acquittal, is
greatest where the trial court thinks that an inadvertent pro-defendant error would turn a conviction into an (unappealable) acquittal. But where a pro-government ruling prevents an acquittal,
the harmless error doctrine will not be applied on appeal. Analogously, the trial court's incentive to favor the defendant, and
thereby avoid reversal, is greatest where the trial court thinks that
an inadvertent pro-government error would turn an acquittal into
a conviction. Since an appellate court would not deem such an error to be harmless, the harmless error rule does not remove the
incentive to favor the defendant in these cases.
Where, however, the trial court is uncertain whether an error
would be deemed harmless-as may often be the case 1 2 -- the
harmless error rule may affect the court's resolution of the legal
issue. We have seen that, to the extent the trial court is concerned
with avoiding reversal, it has an incentive to rule in favor of the
defendant on close issues. The harmless error rule decreases this
incentive for conscious pro-defendant error because it accords
some protection against reversal should the trial court make an inadvertent pro-government error. The trial court has less incentive
to shade its rulings in a pro-defendant direction because the harmless error doctrine already reduces the risk of reversal.
But if the objective of "avoiding reversal" is shorthand for a
set of values involving the trial court's reputation and self-esteem,
the harmless error doctrine will not ameliorate pro-defendant bias.
Where the trial court's concern is with appellate pronouncement of
"'

See Section IV.

,,0At the time the trial court makes many evidentiary and other rulings, it has not yet
seen all of the evidence of guilt and cannot predict the likely outcome of the case.
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trial court error, not simply appellate reversal,121 the harmless er-

ror doctrine will not affect its incentive to favor the defendant on
close issues of law.
Even if the harmless error rule only slightly reduces the incentive to avoid reversal, its impact is not uniform across legal issues
or, for any given legal issue, across cases. For many legal standards,
the doctrine has no systematic effect on trial court decisions; violation of the legal standard would be "harmless" in cases where
other evidence of guilt is strong, but might mean the difference
between conviction and acquittal in other cases. The rule probably
has its greatest systematic impact on two kinds of legal issues:
those that seldom affect trial outcome, and those that are costly to
decide correctly. When applying legal prohibitions or prescriptions
that do not directly relate to trial outcome, including many grand
jury and other pre-trial requirements not subject to immediate appeal, the trial court has little fear of reversal because any error
likely will be deemed harmless. Hence we should seldom observe
trial courts unduly favoring defendants on these issues. For legal
standards that are difficult or costly for the trial court to comply
with, the harmless error doctrine may produce particularly undesirable results; where such legal standards implement values unrelated to trial outcome, it may be appropriate not to apply the
harmless error doctrine, because fear of reversal may be the major
incentive the trial court has to comply with such standards.
D. Harmless Error and the Appellate Court
If we assume that the appellate court seeks only to apply the
previously articulated standard of law, then the harmless error
doctrine by hypothesis does not affect the standard, as explained
in the previous section with respect to the trial court.
Perhaps, however, this is the point at which to recognize a
possible source of appellate error not yet addressed: appellate
prejudice against defendants, who, after all, have been "found" to
be criminals. Particularly where the evidence of guilt at trial was
very strong, even apart from any pro-government error, the appellate court may be reluctant to reverse.
If such judicial bias against criminal appellants exists, the
harmless error doctrine is a near-perfect means of ensuring that
"I See Van Arsdall, 475 US at 686 (White concurring) ("No judge welcomes or can
ignore being told that he committed a constitutional violation, even if the conviction is
saved by a harmless-error finding.").
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such bias does not affect the development of legal standards. Without the doctrine, an "anti-defendant" appellate court might conclude that the relevant legal standard had been violated, yet hold
(in order to prevent reversal) that the trial court did not make a
pro-government error. These additional affirmances (pro-government errors) by the appellate court would cause the legal standard,
which is derived from appellate precedent, to shift in a pro-government direction.
The harmless error doctrine effectively insulates the legal
standard from this form of judicial bias when there is powerful evidence of guilt apart from the error-precisely the circumstance in
which such bias will be strongest. The appellate court can hold
that the legal standard was violated, but that the trial court's error
was harmless. Commentators have argued that legal standards governing investigation and prosecution in England are more pro-government than in the United States in part because England's
harmless error doctrine is relatively narrow: errors are rarely
deemed harmless in criminal cases. 1 22 English appellate courts, reluctant to reverse convictions of the clearly guilty, narrowly interpret defendants' rights and broadly interpret prosecutorial powers.123 The harmless error doctrine may prevent this anti-

defendant bias in the development of criminal law standards in
this country. Equally important, if appellate courts are otherwise
disposed to expand the scope of defendants' rights in criminal
cases, the harmless error rule allows them to do so without necessarily reversing convictions on appeal. 24
12' The standard in England for harmless error is whether the defendant would have
been convicted "without doubt" in the absence of the error. See J. R. Spencer, Criminal
Law and CriminalAppeals-The Tail that Wags the Dog, 1982 Crim L Rev 260, 265. This
standard is an interpretation of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, § 2(1), 39 Stat in Force, ch
19 (1978), which allows courts to affirm convictions in spite of legal error if "they consider
that no miscarriage of justice has actually occurred." Spencer asserts that the narrow interpretation of this provision allows courts to "quash the conviction of any appellant who [can]
point to any failure of due process." 1982 Crim L Rev at 264. See also Rosemary Pattenden,
The Judge, Discretion, and the Criminal Trial 30-31 (Clarendon, 1982).
123 Spencer suggests that courts narrowly construe due process standards because of the
narrow scope of the harmless error doctrine. Spencer, 1982 Crim L Rev at 282. In addition,
it should be noted that reversal in England usually leads to outright acquittal, not retrial.
Criminal Appeal Act of 1968 §§ 2(2), 2(3). See generally Michael Knight, Criminal Appeals
(Stevens & Sons, 1970).
124 There is some empirical support for the proposition that in criminal appeals the
harmless error doctrine produces standards that are more pro-defendant than they would
otherwise be. As previously noted, the author's review of a sample of criminal appeals found
that over 60 percent of the errors identified by the appellate court were held harmless. See
note 113. The author's review of civil appeals for the same period in the same court (201
issues in 104 cases) revealed that only 8 percent of identified trial court errors were held
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CONCLUSION

I have analyzed some consequences of the asymmetric structure of appeal in criminal cases. Assuming that courts are otherwise free from party bias, the skewed distribution of cases on appeal not only results in more pro-defendant than pro-government
legal error, but may also introduce a pro-defendant bias in the
evolution of legal standards and provide an incentive for trial
courts to rule in favor of defendants on close legal issues.
The risk analysis developed in Section I (and the more formal
model presented in the Appendix) shows how the rule prohibiting
government appeals, coupled with near universal appeal by convicted defendants, produces an asymmetry in the distribution of
disputed legal issues on appeal. Assuming that both trial and appellate courts seek to apply the legal standard implied by appellate
precedent, there is more pro-defendant legal error than pro-government legal error in final outcomes.1 25
Asymmetry in the distribution of disputes on appeal and in
the distribution of appellate legal error is not the result of judicial
bias. Nonetheless, these asymmetries may introduce bias in judicial decision making, as suggested in Section I. Even if courts seek
only to apply the precedential standard, constraints on their decision processes may cause their perception of that standard to be
skewed the same way that the distribution of appellate error is
skewed-in a pro-defendant direction. In particular, if the trial
court derives the precedential standard by balancing pro-defendant and pro-government appellate inconsistency, it will perceive
the appellate court to be applying a more pro-defendant standard

harmless. This suggests that the appellate court used the harmless error doctrine to expand
the scope of defendants' rights; the court held that the trial court should have given wider
scope to defendants' rights, but did not want to reverse the convictions.
Neither these data nor similar data, however, can confirm the hypothesis that the
harmless error doctrine works to the benefit of criminal defendants as a class. The comparison of harmless error rulings in civil and criminal cases is complicated by the fact that the
distribution of appeals in criminal cases is skewed in a pro-government direction because
nearly all criminal convictions are appealed. See note 39. This may result both in a lower
percentage of errors identified in criminal appeals, see notes 52 and 113, and in a higher
percentage of identified errors that are deemed harmless.
More generally, data cannot reveal how the appellate (or trial) courts would rule in the
absence of a harmless error rule for criminal cases. I have suggested that appellate courts
would find fewer errors; critics of the harmless error rule apparently assume that the appellate courts would simply reverse more convictions.
125 The analysis in Section I assumes that the distribution of disputes in the trial court
is symmetric around the initial legal standard. The relative pro-defendant skew in legal
error is even greater under a more plausible distribution of disputes. See text at notes 76-80.
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than the appellate court is actually applying. 126 The appellate
court itself may be misled by or dissatisfied with standards under
which the government usually prevails on appeal, and may therefore be disposed to shift legal standards in a pro-defendant
12 7
direction.
If we relax the assumption that trial courts seek only to apply
the precedential legal standard, it becomes evident that the asymmetry in criminal appeals creates additional sources of bias. Section IV considered alternative or supplementary objectives of the
trial court: avoiding reversal and (less plausibly) minimizing the
risk of uncorrected legal error. The first additional objective militates in favor of more pro-defendant error in the trial court, and
the second in favor of more pro-government error, but I conclude
that the first effect may be expected to predominate in nearly all
cases.
Section V considered the extent to which the harmless error
doctrine may counteract pro-defendant biases caused by the prohibition on government appeals. For a limited set of issues, the doctrine may cause trial courts systematically to apply more pro-government standards of law than they would otherwise. But the
harmless error doctrine will not ameliorate the trial court's incentive to favor defendants (and thereby avoid reversal) in cases
where the incentive is most likely to be determinative. I also suggest that, contrary to the assumption or expectation of many commentators, the harmless error doctrine may actually encourage appellate courts to develop more pro-defendant standards of law.
Although we can identify countervailing ways in which the
prohibition on government appeals might increase total pro-government error or introduce pro-government bias into judicial decision making, these effects appear much weaker than the pro-defendant distortions and biases. The rule against government
appeals increases pro-government legal error where appeals courts
defer to the legal evaluations of trial courts, 28 where trial courts
seek to reduce the risk of uncorrected error,2 9 and where the
harmless error rule applies.3 0 In large measure, however, the latter
two contingencies simply lessen the pro-defendant bias in applica126 See text at notes 61-65. In addition, pro-defendant legal error will increase if the
trial court derives the legal standard from random sampling of appellate precedent. See text
at notes 59-60.
127

See text at notes 66-70.

See text at notes 71-75.
129
130

See text at notes 98-107.
See text at notes 115-18.
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tion of the legal standard that would otherwise result from the
trial court's efforts to avoid reversal.' 3 ' Moreover, even in these situations, the rule against government appeals does not exert a continuing pro-government bias in the evolution of legal standards.'3 2
At least as important as the pro-defendant biases that asymmetric appellate rights may exert on the evolution and application
of legal standards are the adjustments that courts and litigants
may make in response. Section III of the article suggested several
possible responses, including strategies to achieve a more symmetric distribution of disputes on appeal. The range of cases considered by the appellate court may be effectively expanded by the
appellate court explaining in dicta the limits of particular rulings,
or by the government as appellee in other cases bringing pro-defendant trial court rulings to the attention of the appellate court.
Moreover, litigants, especially prosecutors, may respond strategically to the possibility of selection effects by raising issues that
otherwise would not be pursued, thereby achieving a more symmetric distribution of disputes on appeal and reducing selection
effects. If trial and appellate courts are not able to adjust for selection effects or engage in self-correction, the Supreme Court may
occasionally intervene to reverse unwarranted evolution of a legal
standard.
It is possible that these various strategies in isolation or in
combination counteract any distortion in the evolution of criminal
law standards that would otherwise result from asymmetry in appellate rights. These strategic responses may not themselves be desirable, however, and, in any event, cannot counteract the incentive that asymmetry in criminal appeals provides for trial judges to
favor defendants on close issues of law.' 3 3
Yet the one-sided incentive for trial court error in criminal
cases also is not an inevitable consequence of our criminal justice
system. It is possible to reduce the asymmetry in criminal appeal
rights without permitting the government to appeal jury acquittals.
In the federal system and all state systems, the government has
long been permitted to appeal certain pre-trial dismissals of indictments. I have noted that in 1968 Congress authorized the govern-

131See text at notes 98-103 (regarding trial court objective of reducing risk of erroneous
acquittal); and text at notes 120-121 (regarding application of the harmless error doctrine).
13' A secret policy of appellate deference could result in a pro-government shift in the
standard, but if the trial court (or other observers) are aware of the policy, the standard of
law derived from precedent will not shift. See text at notes 89-91.
"' See notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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ment to appeal pre-trial rulings suppressing evidence.1 3 A major
impetus for the 1968 legislation was the Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
3 5 The Commission reThe Challenge of Crime in a Free Society."
jected the argument that the absence of government appeals makes
no difference in the development and application of legal standards. As the Commission explained:
When the prosecution is not permitted an appeal, law enforcement officials faced with restrictive rulings they feel are erroneous have available two courses, each of which is undesirable: They can follow the lower court decision and abandon
the practice, in which case an authoritative decision by an appellate court may never be obtained, or they can continue the
practice, hoping that in a future case a trial court will sustain
it and that a defendant by appealing will give the higher court
36
an opportunity to resolve the point.1
In other words, when the government is not allowed to appeal, erroneous pro-defendant rulings in the trial court may never be corrected. The appellate court may continue to apply the correct standard, but, absent a maverick prosecutor and trial court, the trial
court will continue to apply the wrong standard.
The present analysis suggests that the potential distortions in
the law resulting from one-sided appeal are even more significant
than the 1968 Report indicated. Asymmetric appellate rights mean
not only that erroneous pro-defendant law in the trial court may
never be corrected, but also that the legal standards enunciated by
appellate courts or applied by trial courts may shift in a pro-defendant direction. 13 7 Moreover, to the extent that courts and liti"' See note 44 and accompanying text. This portion of 18 USC § 3731 (1982 & Supp
1989) provides:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order
of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence ... not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy ... if the United States Attorney certifies to the
district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is
a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
In previous years, similar legislative initiatives had been unsuccessful. See, for example, Improving Federal Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, S Rep No 85-1478, 85th
Cong, 1st Sess (as extended) 14-17 (1958).
131 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 140 (GPO, 1967).
136

Id.

" The Commission's argument about trial court error applies also to appellate law-

making. The appellate court has less opportunity to revise a pro-defendant change in the
law that it made previously than it has to revise a pro-government change in the law. See
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gants are aware of the possibility of pro-defendant bias in the
evolution and application of legal standards, they may be expected
to adjust their behavior. In particular, in order to counteract distortion in the evolution of criminal standards, prosecutors may assert claims of dubious legal merit that they would otherwise forego.
Congress has more recently authorized additional government
appeal from pre-trial rulings and from other adverse rulings that
do not implicate the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. 3 '
Nonetheless, under the present structure of criminal trials, the
government may not appeal many issues of law, especially those
relating to the conduct of a trial, to admission of evidence, and to
jury instructions.'3 9 For these legal issues, asymmetry in appellate
rights and in legal error may distort the application and evolution
of legal standards-not because such distortion is constitutionally
desirable and not because courts are biased on average, but because of the peculiar consequences of asymmetric appeal rights on
the judicial decision making process.
If we restructured criminal litigation to encourage greater pretrial consideration of legal disputes likely to arise at trial, 4 ° we
note 83 and accompanying text.
138 See Act of January 2, 1971, Pub L No 91-644, 84 Stat 1890 (1971), codified at 18

USC § 3731 (1982 & Supp 1989); Act of October 12, 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1986,
2153 (1984), codified at 18 USC § 3731 (1982 & Supp 1989). Together, these statutes authorize the government to appeal any trial court order "dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment ... except that no appeal shall lie
where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution." In some state systems and in the federal system (the latter under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1988 (1984), codified at 18 USC § 3551 et seq
and 28 USC § 991-98 (1982 & Supp 1989)), the government may appeal criminal sentences.
The constitutionality of such review was upheld against a double jeopardy attack in United
States v DiFrancesco,449 US 117, 133-38 (1980).
"' Present federal law does not authorize government appeals in all instances not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Only some adverse pre-trial evidentiary rulings are
appealable-those suppressing evidence. Hence, the government may not appeal pre-trial
rulings that grant a defendant's motion in limine to present certain evidence, that relate to
the conduct of trial, or that formulate jury instructions. Furthermore, the trial court apparently has discretion to defer ruling on some pre-trial motions until after jeopardy has attached, thereby preventing government appeal. See, for example, United States v Valencia,
826 F2d 169 (2d Cir 1987); and United States v Barletta,644 F2d 50 (1st Cir 1981). See also
United States v Tom, 787 F2d 65 (2d Cir 1986) (government cannot appeal pre-trial
dismissal of portion of count in indictment where dismissed portion is not "discrete basis of
liability"); contra, United States v King, 827 F2d 864 (1st Cir 1987).
1 0 Some trial courts, largely on their own initiative, undertake wide-ranging pre-trial
disposition of legal issues in complex criminal cases, as is routine in complex civil cases. See
the pre-trial rulings of Judge Gesell in United States v North (for example, 708 F Supp 364
(D DC 1988); 708 F Supp 370 (D DC 1988); and 708 F Supp 372 (D DC 1988)). But see also
Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc., 1990 WL 184, 49-50 (3d Cir, Jan 5, 1990) (Gibbons concurring) (arguing, inter alia, that previous interlocutory appeal, on theory of liability, should
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could instill greater symmetry in appellate rights.1 4 Before undertaking any wholesale restructuring of criminal procedure,'1 42 however, we need further empirical research on the extent of pro-defendant-or pro-government-bias resulting from the present
asymmetry in criminal appeal rights. This research may be difficult. Selection effects exist only if courts and prosecutors are unaware of them or otherwise unable to adjust for them. 43 I doubt
that readily available data exist that would document the presence
or absence of selection effects in various circumstances. Nor can
data on reversals and affirmances, or on application of the harmless error rule, reveal the extent to which trial courts have an incentive to commit pro-defendant error to avoid reversal., 4 Carefully constructed interviews with judges may be the most
promising avenue of research to determine the extent of selection
effects and of incentives for trial court error. Until this research is
conducted and firmer conclusions can be drawn, judicial awareness
of the possibility of inadvertent biases and pernicious incentives
may be the best antidote to these unintended effects.

not have been taken in absence of a factual record).
14 It has also been proposed that where pre-trial consideration of an evidentiary issue
is not appropriate, a significant mid-trial ruling against the government should under certain circumstances be cause for a mistrial on grounds of "manifest necessity," see note 38,
thereby permitting government appeal and retrial without violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See Note, Reviewing the Unreviewable Judge: FederalProsecutionAppeals of MidTrial Evidentiary Rulings, 99 Yale L J 905 (1990). This approach to increasing symmetry in
criminal trial appeals clearly would involve a radical (and disruptive) restructuring of criminal litigation.
142 There are two statutory changes that could enlarge opportunities for government
appeals in criminal cases without clearly running afoul of the prohibition on double jeopardy. First, Congress might authorize the government to appeal bench trial acquittals, as
opposed to jury acquittals, when correction of the judge's legal error would allow a guilty
verdict to be entered without a new trial. Second, Congress might authorize government
appeals regarding jury instructions where the jury's special findings of fact are inconsistent
with its general verdict of acquittal. These proposals are briefly discussed in a publication of
the Office of Legal Policy of the United States Department of Justice, Report to the Attorney General: Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Acquittals (GPO, 1987).
14M
14

See Section III generally.
See note 124.
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Appendix
GRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE RISK OF ERROR

The following graphs are based on two key assumptions underlying the risk analysis in Section I: (1) unbiased legal error in
both the trial and appellate court; and (2) a symmetric distribution
of confessions in the trial court around the constitutional standard.

Figure A-1:
Probability Density Function for the Trial Court's
Estimate of the Voluntariness Index
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1. Figure A-1 is a schematic representation of a court's assessment of the voluntariness of confessions. The horizontal axis is the
voluntariness continuum and measures the index of voluntariness,
V: the further to the right the index value, the more voluntary the
statement. The vertical axis measures probability. The curve
graphed on these axes shows the probability density function f(v),
where v is the trial court's estimate of the voluntariness index, for
a confession with an actual voluntariness index of Vx. Hence the
curve illustrates the distribution of possible voluntariness indices
that a court will assign to a confession with an actual voluntariness
level of Vx. Note that the curve in Figure A-1 is the density function for a distribution centered at the true index value, Vx, because of the assumption of unbiased judicial error. Accordingly,
over the set of confessions with a true index value of Vx, the court
will implicitly assess a value higher (more voluntary) than Vx half
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of the time, and a value lower (less voluntary) than Vx half of the
time.
Figure A-1 also depicts the constitutional standard, V*. This is
the initial precedential legal standard. Because Vx is greater than
V*, all confessions with this implicit voluntariness index are constitutionally voluntary and should be admitted into evidence.
However, the trial court will erroneously suppress a confession
with a V x index level in a small proportion of cases (represented
by the shaded area in Figure A-i) because the court erroneously
perceives the level of voluntariness to be below V*. In Figure A-i,
for instance, the constitutional standard and the actual level of
voluntariness are positioned so that the shaded area is five percent
of the area under the curve-meaning that there is a five percent
probability that a trial court will erroneously suppress a confession
that has a true voluntariness index of Vx .

Figure A-2:
Probability of Trial Court Error
Conditional on the True Value of the Voluntariness Index
P(e)
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2. For confessions at each level of voluntariness, there is a
probability density function like that in Figure A-1. These density
functions enable us to derive the court's error characteristic in Figure A-2: the probability of legal error as a function of each true
index level, given that the constitutional standard is V*. The horizontal axis is again the actual voluntariness continuum; the vertical axis, however, measures the probability of error. Figure A-2 is

The University of Chicago Law Review

[57:1

derived by integrating at each level of voluntariness the corresponding density function (Figure A-i) over the error interval. See
Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on
Choices Under Uncertainty 281-82 (Addison-Wesley, 1970). For
instance, when the index equals Vx , the probability of error equals
five percent (on the vertical axis), which is consistent with Figure
A-1. More generally, the likelihood of legal error is a decreasing
function of the distance between the actual index level and the
constitutional standard; error is less likely when the actual index
level is much greater or much smaller than the constitutional standard. Where the actual index level equals the standard, there is a
fifty percent chance that the court will err.
Figure A-3:
Distribution of Disputes in the Trial Court and
Distribution of Trial Court Errors
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3. The horizontal axis of Figure A-3 again measures the voluntariness index level (V), while the vertical axis measures
probability. The outer curve of Figure A-3 shows the distribution
of confessions that are disputed in the trial court, with the area
under the curve normalized to one. Hence, for each index level, the
area under the outer curve of Figure A-3 to the left of the index
level gives the percentage of contested confessions with that index
or lower. The simple risk analysis in Section I of the text and in
this graphical demonstration assumes a distribution of confessions
in the trial court that is symmetric around the constitutional standard, V*, with most confessions near the standard.
Multiplying the probability of error for each voluntariness
level (from Figure A-2) by the distribution of contested cases (de-
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picted in the outer curve of Figure A-3) yields the distribution of
legal error, which is shown as the inner curve of Figure A-3. The
shaded area to the right of V* (noted as area I) shows cases in
which the trial court makes pro-defendant error-that is, cases in
which a confession is erroneously suppressed. The inner shaded
area to the left of V* (noted as area II) shows cases in which the
trial court makes pro-government error-that is, cases in which a
confession is erroneously admitted. Where the actual voluntariness
index approaches the standard, trial court error approaches fifty
percent (hence the height of the inner curve is half the height of
the outer curve). Because area I and area II are symmetric and
equal in size, the incidence of pro-defendant and pro-government
error is the same.
Figure A-3 is related to the numerical example provided in
note 50 and Table 1 in note 51. In order to depict legal error more
vividly, however, Figure A-3 illustrates a higher overall incidence
of legal error than the 10 percent hypothesized in the numerical
example. Area I in Figure A-3 corresponds to Box B (pro-defendant errors) and area II corresponds to Box C (pro-government
errors).
Figure A-4:
Distribution of Disputes on Appeal and
Distribution of Appellate Error
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4. The outer curve of Figure A-4 depicts the distribution of
cases on appeal raising the voluntariness issue, which is identical
to the distribution of confessions admitted by the trial court. Accordingly, the cases under the outer curve in Figure A-4 are those
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that are in area II and in the unshaded area between area I and
the outer curve in Figure A-3. Because pro-defendant rulings (suppression rulings) cannot be appealed, the distribution is asymmetric; it is skewed to the right of the constitutional standard, V*.
Multiplying the probability of error for each voluntariness
level (from Figure A-2) by the distribution of appealed cases (depicted in the outer curve of Figure A-4) yields the distribution of
appellate error, which is the inner curve of Figure A-4. (I have assumed that the trial court and the appellate court have the same
error characteristic. This assumption is not necessarily realistic,
however. See note 99.) The appellate court should affirm in all
cases to the right of V* because these confessions are voluntary,
and it should reverse in the few cases to the left of V* because
these confessions are involuntary. In fact, however, the appellate
court occasionally reverses in cases with index levels greater than
V* (area Ia), and occasionally affirms in cases with index levels less
than V* (area IIa). Area Ia consists of pro-defendant appellate error, while area Ha consists of pro-government appellate error.
Figure A-4 is related to the numerical example provided in
note 52 and Table 3 in note 54. Total pro-defendant error consists
of area I in Figure A-3 (50 trial errors in the numerical example)
plus area Ia in Figure A-4 (the 36 appellate errors in the example
of note 54), while total pro-government error consists of area Ha in
Figure A-4 (the 10 appellate errors in the numerical example).
Figure A-5:
Perceived Standard of Law from Balancing
Instead of Minimizing Appellate Error
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5. Figure A-5 reproduces the appellate outcomes shown in Fig-
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ure A-4, and shows the standard, V**, at which apparent pro-defendant error (area Ia of Figure A-5) equals apparent pro-government error (area Ha of Figure A-5). This is the standard which the
trial court (or other observer) with constrained decision making resources will perceive if it balances instead of minimizes inconsistency in appellate rulings. At the standard V**, a portion of area
Ia in Figure A-4-that portion under the inner curve between V*
and V**-becomes unshaded because the appellate rulings in this
area appear to be correct under the higher standard of voluntariness. At the same time, the larger area between the two curves for
values between V* and V** becomes part of area Ha in Figure A-5
because the appellate rulings in this area appear to be erroneously
pro-government under the higher standard. V** is a higher (more
pro-defendant) standard than is V*.

